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SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE AND ARMY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DOUGLAS E. CARROLL, MAJ, USA  
B.A., University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, 1979

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1993

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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
  
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

Army Special Forces Doctrine and Army Operations Doctrine, by Major Douglas E. Carroll, USA, 142 pages.

This study investigates the compatibility of current Army Special Forces doctrine as enunciated in FM 31-20, February 1990, and the future Army doctrine of Army Operations as enunciated in FM 100-5, (Final Draft), 19 January 1993. For testing purposes, compatibility analysis relies on the complete research form of methodology.

The compatibility test applies not only to the foundations of Army doctrine and Special Forces doctrine but also to the four Special Forces missions and the two primary Army Operations missions. This thesis accepts as the foundations of Army Operations doctrine the principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, and the tenets. Further, this thesis accepts as the foundations of Special Forces doctrine the principles of war and the Special Operations imperatives. The four Special Forces missions include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. The two Army Operations missions are offense and defense. As determined by methodology and the literature review, the criteria used to determine compatibility are that the foundations and missions must be consistent and unified.

This thesis concludes that current Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine are compatible. The study additionally demonstrates that all Special Forces missions contribute to the offense and defense almost exclusively in the deep operations area.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are numerous people that I wish to thank who have contribute immeasurably to this thesis. First among these is my committee chairman, MAJ John Swanson. No one could ask for a better committee chairman than John. He has given me invaluable guidance, provided a confidence when times were tuff, and remains a good friend. Dr. Bruce Menning read this thesis numerous times under a microscope. His patience and expertise have been extremely important. LTC Stan Florer and Mr. Roland Dutton have kept me on track as concerns Special Forces and my ACE, LTC Lee Smith, has kept me on track as concerns the rest of the Army. I wish that I had served under Mr. Dutton when he was in Special Forces and I hope someday to serve under LTC Florer. One could not hope for a better commander. I am also indebted to my fellow members of Staff Group 20C who took up the slack for me when I needed it. Most importantly though, I wish to thank the most important person in my life, my wife, Christi. Without her support, her superhuman ability to put up with me, and a lack of weeknights and weekends to share parenthood is astounding. She has lived with me being gone to a war, on a remote United Nations mission, too numerous separations to count, and the future will not be much better. Yet she continues to stand by me. I can not tell her how important she is to me. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the men of the Special Forces, especially the members of ODAs- 541, 133, and 121.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The United States Army's expansion of Special Forces began in the early 1980s. However, because the Army at-large did not feel this expansion, Special Forces was not a major concern for Army doctrine writers. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 created the United States Special Operations Command. In turn the Army created the United States Army Special Operations Command and the United States Army Special Forces Command, making a significant expansion of Special Forces. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 5 May 1986, was written before the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; consequently, this keystone manual failed to reflect the new emphasis on Special Forces.

In 1986 there was no direct line of communication between Special Operation Forces and the constituent corps of the United States Army. Today, each corps has a Special Operations Coordination Element, a permanent part of the corps staff. Staffed solely by Special Operations personnel, this cell is the corps commander's subject matter expert for all Special Operations.

FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations was published on 1 February 1990. This manual is based on the 1986 FM 100-5, Operations. The doctrine in FM 100-5 is known as AirLand Battle.



Published doctrine delineated in FM 31-20 is compatible with the doctrine in the 1986 version of FM 100-5.

The Army is now rewriting FM 100-5. The final draft FM 100-5 is dated 19 January 1993. Is current Special Forces doctrine, as outlined in FM 31-20 compatible with the future doctrine? The future doctrine in the draft FM 100-5 has not been given a name. In order to differentiate this new doctrine from the 1986 FM 100-5, this study labels the new doctrine "Army Operations."

### Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether current Special Forces doctrine is compatible with the future doctrine of Army Operations. Since current Special Forces doctrine is compatible with AirLand Battle doctrine, one of the major tasks of this thesis is to determine the nature and extent of changes between Army Operations doctrine and AirLand Battle doctrine.

In the worst case scenario for Army doctrine writers, Army Operations will change significantly from AirLand Battle doctrine. Significant alteration may be necessary to reflect the dramatic changes that have occurred since 1986. If Army Operations does change significantly from AirLand Battle doctrine, does this require Special Forces to rewrite their doctrine? If the Army leadership determines that all that is needed is an update of the new FM 100-5, will the changes made to AirLand Battle doctrine be significant? Will the new Army Operations doctrine, with only minor differences from AirLand Battle doctrine, require Special Forces to rewrite their doctrine?

Answers to the above questions are of primary importance to the Special Forces community. Although writers of Special Forces doctrine will make the final decision on the compatibility of the two doctrines, this thesis seeks to provide preliminary answers.

### Significance of the Study

Why is it important that Special Forces doctrine be compatible with Army Operations doctrine? The issue of compatibility rests in part on the role of doctrine itself. Colonel Wallace P. Franz perhaps best summarized the significance of doctrine when he wrote:

Military doctrine is a guide to action, one objective of which is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large force in accordance with the intentions of the senior commander. Doctrine develops from principles. Doctrine is also a guide to the application of principles . . . (and) helps to span the difficulty between the understanding of principles and their application.<sup>1</sup>

Doctrine constitutes a set of accepted and understood standards on the application of military principles. Doctrine provides for the unity of thought, speech, and action that is necessary to achieve the unity of effort essential to all military operations. If two doctrines are not compatible, unity of action will be more difficult to achieve, and confusion could easily set in. More importantly, lives could be lost unnecessarily.

The significance of this thesis is clear. Army Operations and Special Forces doctrine must be compatible. If they are not, Special Forces doctrine must change, since FM 100-5 provides the keystone doctrine for the entire Army.

### Scope

This thesis will examine Special Forces doctrine as embodied in FM 31-20. Army Operations doctrine as delineated in the final draft of 19 January 1993 will be accepted as the future Army doctrine. Because of time constraints associated with thesis completion, any changes made to the 19 January 1993 final draft FM 100-5 will not be considered.

### Research Question

Is current Special Forces doctrine compatible with the future doctrine of Army Operations?

In answering the primary question several secondary questions will arise. These secondary questions are:

1. Has the Army's keystone doctrine changed significantly from AirLand Battle doctrine to Army Operations doctrine?
2. Are all of the missions of Special Forces compatible with Army Operations?
3. If all of the missions of Special Forces are not compatible, what must be done to correct the problem?
4. Does anything need to be done if Special Forces doctrine is compatible with Army Operations?

### Assumptions

The approach to this thesis rests on the following assumptions:

1. Army Operations doctrine when published will not change significantly from the final draft dated 19 January 1993.
2. US national strategy and the resultant national military strategy will not change.

3. Special Forces doctrine and its associated missions will not change during the writing of this thesis.

### Limitations

Much of the material relating to Special Operations is classified. This study will address the subject at the unclassified level. Classified sources will be cited only if key points need to be elaborated.

### Delimitations

1. This thesis will be concerned only with Special Forces doctrine, not Special Operations Force doctrine. Special Operations Force doctrine includes Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Aviation. These multiple forces and their relevant doctrine are too broad for this thesis.

2. This thesis will cover only four of the five primary Special Forces missions. These missions are unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. The fifth Special Forces mission is counterterrorism. FM 31-20 gives only the definition of counterterrorism and a very brief discussion of it. Except for a few paragraphs in the manual, counterterrorism is beyond its scope, and therefore will not be covered in this thesis.

3. This thesis will not address training doctrine or the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by Special Forces.

4. Information cutoff date for this thesis is 31 January 1993.

### Definition of Key Terms

Army Operations. The author's title for the doctrine prescribed in FM 100-5 (Final Draft) dated 19 January 1993.

Combat Power. The effect created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in combat against the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Compatible. Capable of existing together in harmony, consistent.<sup>3</sup>

Direct Action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by Special Forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target or to destroy, capture or recover designated personnel or materiel.<sup>4</sup>

Foreign Internal Defense. The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The primary Special Forces mission in this inter-agency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces.<sup>5</sup>

Special Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance conducted to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. Special Forces may also use special reconnaissance to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Special reconnaissance includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.<sup>6</sup>

Unconventional Warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces which are organized,

trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. Unconventional warfare includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape.<sup>7</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter has provided the reader with a background on the expansion of Special Forces in the last decade and recent United States Army doctrine. In addition to this general background, this chapter has established the purpose and significance of this study. Thus the groundwork has been established for answering the research question.

## CHAPTER I I

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review existing literature on Special Forces and to provide a foundation for this thesis. Since Army Operations is new to the Army, no derivative publications exist on it. To provide a foundation in general literature, this review is divided into four categories:

1. The theory and strategy of Special Forces operations.
2. History of Special Forces.
3. Army Doctrine.
4. Special Forces Doctrine.

#### Theory and Strategy

This review of the theory and strategy behind Special Forces doctrine is especially useful as background for chapters three and four of this thesis. The study of the theory and strategy behind Special Forces is included in the study of Special Operations Forces. Available literature rarely treats Special Forces separately. Therefore, unless stated specifically, any information listed below in reference to Special Operations Forces includes Special Forces.

John M. Collins, noted author of U.S. - Soviet Military Balance and a Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress.

was commissioned by the U.S. House Armed Services Committee to evaluate U.S. competence to conduct Special Operations. The resultant book Green Berets, Seals, and Spetsnaz provides an incisive look into the United States ability, or lack thereof, to conduct Special Operations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Writing during and just after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Mr. Collins discusses many of the problems with US Special Operations at that time. Among the problems he discusses are the complexity of US Special Operations and the complacent and inconsistent support accorded to Special Operations. He further identifies the wide gap between theoretical and strategic missions assigned to Special Forces and the resources provided to accomplish these missions. Mr. Collins concludes that, while problems do exist, the United States is getting much better.

Ross S. Kelly's book Special Operations and National Purpose is an excellent book on the theory and strategy of organizing and employing Special Operations Forces. Mr. Kelly states that Special Operation Forces are established and maintained by nations that have identified a requirement to implement a range of specialized military and paramilitary policy options without being forced to resort to the use of conventional units.

He also pointedly describes the strategy behind the use of Special Forces in nations like the United States with complex interests and commitments. Mr. Kelly states that these nations use Special Operations units in the guerrilla-counter guerrilla, mobile training team, and strategic reconnaissance roles as a minimum-escalation option in politically sensitive situations. Special Operations units are used in



instances where national interests are threatened but the commitment of general purpose forces is not warranted. He further states that Special Operations units are used to support conventional military operations in time of war. During peacetime nations use Special Operations units in circumstances requiring special military skills when declarations of war are undesirable or when there is concern that the introduction of conventional force operations may exacerbate a crisis.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Kelly concludes his book with a long standing concern that has been felt by many members of the Special Forces community. Theorists and strategists are quick to recognize the need for Special Operations Forces but are deficient in thinking through what they want Special Operations Forces to achieve. He further states that once the goals have been set, Special Operations Forces must be provided resources, both materiel and political, to accomplish the mission.

A necessary companion to Mr. Kelly's book is Sam C. Sarkesian's The New Battlefield. The United States and Unconventional Conflicts. Mr. Sarkesian's primary purpose is to analyze the United States political-military posture and its effectiveness in responding to unconventional conflicts. His analysis includes an examination of the evolution of United States policy, the nature and character of unconventional conflicts, and United States security interests in the Third World. His main focus is on revolution and counterrevolution because of his belief that these are the most encompassing and long-range unconventional challenges. Mr. Sarkesian's basic theme is that the United States political-military posture and capability to deal with unconventional conflicts are inadequate and mostly ineffective.<sup>2</sup>

The New Battlefield is divided into three parts. Part I is a discussion of the nature of unconventional conflicts and the challenges inherent in them for the United States. Part II is a study of the United States response to unconventional conflicts, concluding with an examination of the essential elements for developing an effective political-military posture for unconventional wars. Part III discusses the philosophical and moral basis of a democracy and how these relate to unconventional warfare.

The New Battlefield is not for general reading. It is, however, must reading for people serious about United States political-military policy. It will not be enjoyable reading for many people, because, as Mr. Sarkesian states in his preface:

This book is not likely to be comforting to government officials or their critics, to the US military services, to civil libertarians, or to members of the mass media. Finally, those who do not believe in the utility of military force and just war theorists will find much to criticize here. In brief, the book is likely to challenge conventional wisdom about the US political system and its responses to unconventional conflicts.<sup>3</sup>

Roger Beaumont's Special Operations and Elite Units, 1939-1988, while a research guide, contains a long introduction which provides a discussion of various *corps d'élite*. The introduction, provides a lead-in to the research bibliography, and is a thought provoking general analysis of *corps d'élite*. His brief discussion of the Special Forces selection process in many countries is a subject that requires further study. Mr. Beaumont leaves the reader with an important assertion which should be considered before employing Special Forces.

This is,

When they win, special units and operations may be invaluable, whether they gain publicity or not. But when they visibly fail, the costs are almost always greater politically than their controllers anticipated--strong medicine and strong side-effects. The small print on the bottle should be read very carefully. . . .<sup>4</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel John J. McCuen in his 1966 book The Art of Counter - Revolutionary War conducts a comprehensive study of psychological, political, and military aspects of counter-revolutionary warfare. He develops a counter-revolutionary strategy that is revolutionary strategy and principles in reverse. Accordingly, the phases of counter-revolutionary warfare as described by him are counter-organization, counter-terrorism, counter-guerrilla warfare, and counter-mobile warfare. While this strategy might sound simplistic, its application is not. To accomplish this strategy, the counter-revolutionary, as described by Lieutenant Colonel McCuen, must complete four important tasks.

The first task is to determine the phase of the revolutionary war. This is not simple, since guerrillas will probably be in different stages in different parts of the country. Yet, this step is important because the counter-action must be consonant with the local situation.<sup>5</sup>

The second task is to develop appropriate tactics to secure strategic bases against guerrilla infiltration and to prevent or delay the establishment of guerrilla base areas. The counter-revolutionaries' bases should be secured before destroying the guerrilla bases. Thus, the counter-revolutionary should accumulate all available means to defeat the guerrilla with the understanding that the initial commitment of all

available means will save an exponentially larger commitment of forces later on.<sup>6</sup>

The third task is to develop a long term counter-revolutionary plan. This plan must allow the counter-revolutionary not only to stop the guerrillas' progress, but to seize the initiative and drive the guerrillas back through the successive stages of revolutionary war until the guerrillas have been defeated.<sup>7</sup>

The fourth task is to mobilize, organize, and commit the massive means required to implement the plan over the prolonged period necessary to win a counter-revolutionary war. These means must be unified in their application and must not be dissipated by doing too much with too little.<sup>8</sup>

In conclusion, Lieutenant Colonel McCuen stresses the fact that the sooner the established government acts, the lesser will be the resources which will have to be committed to defeat the guerrillas. Winning a revolutionary war takes tremendous dedication, sacrifice, organization, and time. The government must decide early on if it is willing to pay this price. Half-measures will only lead to a protracted and costly defeat. And finally, the counter-revolutionary must engage and defeat the guerrilla on the revolutionary rather than on the conventional battlefield.<sup>15</sup>

Modern Guerrilla Warfare, edited by Franklin Mark Osanka, is an anthology of articles on communist guerrilla movements from 1941-1961. Among the communist guerrilla movements covered in this book are communist China, the Philippines, Greece, Indochina, Malaysia, and Cuba. In addition, Modern Guerrilla Warfare contains a number of

articles on the theory, policies, and procedures of guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations during a twenty-year span. These articles are beneficial for anyone studying this type of warfare. Lastly, Modern Guerrilla warfare concludes with an excellent research bibliography for books and articles prior to 1961.

Partisan Warfare by Dr. Otto Heilbrunn is the best all-encompassing book on guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare. Published in 1962, Partisan Warfare presents historical examples of guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations during World War II, as well as operations from Greece, Cyprus, Malaysia, Kenya, Indochina and Algeria. Dr. Heilbrunn weaves the writings of Mao Tse-tung and the Viet-minh into his accounts to develop some general principles at the strategic, operational and tactical levels for guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare. Dr. Heilbrunn, in a manner similar to Lieutenant Colonel McCuen, portrays guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare as the same type of warfare, but exactly opposite in execution.

Dr. Heilbrunn, in trying to form some general principles for guerrilla warfare, has one overriding concern. This concern is that "... while some general rules for partisan warfare can be devised, a general theory for revolutionary movements cannot be developed because, sometimes at least, each goes its own individual way."<sup>10</sup> But while concluding this, he goes on to state that the best guide for guerrilla warfare at the strategic level is Mao Tse-tung.

Mao's method for conducting guerrilla warfare at the strategic level is to establish correct relationships of command, establish base areas, coordinate guerrilla warfare with regular warfare, develop mobile

warfare, be prepared to conduct strategic offensive and defensive warfare at the same time, and to conduct offensives in a defensive war, and quick battles in a protracted war.<sup>11</sup>

Dr. Heilbrunn also recommends Mao at the tactical level. Dr. Heilbrunn recommends following Mao's ten military principles of guerrilla tactics. These are: (1) Attack scattered and isolated enemies first, then attack the strong enemy forces; (2) Take small towns first, then large towns; (3) The main objective is to destroy the enemy's forces, not to hold cities; (4) Before every battle, mass absolutely superior forces; (5) Fight neither unprepared nor unless victory is assured; (6) Fear neither death nor exhaustion; fight many battles in a short time; (7) Fight the enemy while he is moving; (8) Take weak cities first, then those with medium defenses, and then strongly defended cities; (9) Use captured enemy weapons to arm yourself; (10) Use intervals between battles for resting, reorganizing, and training, but do not give the enemy time to relax.<sup>12</sup>

As for counter guerrilla warfare Dr. Heilbrunn has developed twelve principles which are summarized as follows: (1) Fight a short war; (2) Attack the enemy's strongest points first; (3) The major objective is not to annihilate the enemy's fighting strength; (4) Do not hold more ground than you can afford; (5) Do not give the enemy the chance to encircle you; (6) Keep up the offensive spirit among your troops; (7) Surprise is a main element of successful anti-guerrilla tactics; (8) Penetrate the enemy; (9) Isolate the enemy by denying him access to the population and cutting his supply lines; (10) Have good communications; (11) Keep your static defenses to a minimum and if

necessary resettle the population; (12) Do not treat the population and guerrilla prisoners harshly.<sup>13</sup>

Several books have been published over the last ten years that consist of edited papers delivered at conferences whose subjects concern Special Operations Forces. Two of the more important conferences and their resultant books are reviewed below. These provide the reader with the thoughts of many of the commentators who form influential segments within government, the military, academia, and the business community.

Special Operations in US Strategy is a collection of papers delivered and edited discussion which occurred at a two day symposium in March 1983. The subject of the symposium was "The Role of Special Operations in US Strategy for the 1980s." It was jointly sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center, the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the National Defense University.

The symposium, even though it was conducted ten years ago, expressed many of the same concerns that trouble Special Operations Forces today. One concern was that the probability of low-intensity conflicts was increasing every day and that these conflicts would seriously affect United States interests. A second concern was, "Why, in the face of such manifest danger, has US national security planning been inadequate to cope with this special problem?"<sup>14</sup>

Some final concerns were that for at least a decade the United States had under emphasized all aspects for the one level of conflict most likely to arise during the 1980s. The strategy that would govern a response to this level of conflict had also been neglected. And finally,

Special Operations was still outside the mainstream of United States military force structure and doctrine.<sup>15</sup>

With these concerns as background, the conference was organized with three specific, although limited purposes. The first was to identify and discuss the form and scope of special operations and to consider whether the existing ability to conduct them permitted the United States to respond effectively to conventional crises and limited war conflicts in the 1980s. The second purpose was to determine whether there was a sound basis for legitimization in governmental circles and in public attitudes of Special Operations as an element of United States security strategy. The final purpose was to enable government specialists in different sectors of the Special Operations community (the United States Information Agency, The National Security Council staff, the CIA, and the various components of the armed services) to exchange ideas with each other and with selected academics and journalists on the subject of special operations.<sup>16</sup>

The book is divided into eight chapters. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of Special Operations, and, except for the chapter on Soviet Special Operations, is as pertinent today as it was in 1983. Chapter one is on Special Operations and the threats to United States interests. Chapter two is on the American moral, legal, political and cultural constraints on Special Operations. Chapters three and four are on Soviet and United States Special Operations capabilities, respectively. Chapter five discusses the relationship between intelligence and Special Operations. Chapter six focuses on economic and security assistance and their relationship to Special Operations, while chapter seven



addresses psychological operations. Chapter eight is concerned with organizational strategy, both civilian and military, and low-intensity conflict.

While this book provides much interesting and thought provoking discussion about Special Operations, there is one glaring shortcoming. Conference proceedings provide no recommendations to fix the problems mentioned. While each individual writer provides his individual answers, there is no consensus from the symposium members.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency is a compilation of edited papers delivered at a major conference of leading authorities in government, academia, the military, journalism, and research institutes. The conference, titled "Protracted Warfare - The Third World Arena: A Dimension of United States - Soviet Conflict," was a comprehensive study of guerrilla warfare, insurgency/counterinsurgency and the many political, psychological, and military dimensions of low-intensity conflict.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, while concentrating on the United States - Soviet competition in the Third World, is still a very interesting and thought provoking study. Although the study was conducted in 1987, before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States perspective is still very much up-to-date.

The book is divided into five sections. The first section concerns United States and Soviet approaches to Third World conflicts, the broad objectives each pursues, and the constraints confronting each. Section two deals with the specific doctrines and strategies the United States and Soviets have developed to pursue low-intensity conflict. Section three

concerns the force structure, command, control, and communications, and technologies associated with prolonged warfare. Section four examines the political and psychological dimensions of low-intensity conflict. Section five is a series of case studies of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations going on in 1987 in which the United States and the Soviet Union were involved.<sup>17</sup>

This book shows that in the United States, low-intensity conflict, in spite of the experience gained in Vietnam, remains difficult to comprehend, especially from the military perspective. The book states that, because conventional forces dominated our military doctrine, a comprehensive doctrine for low-intensity operations did not exist in 1987. Additionally, the United States, from a strategic and tactical perspective, lacks civilian institutional memory and experience. The absence of adequate doctrine and capabilities is worsened by frequently ambiguous and contradictory congressional policy. Ambiguous and contradictory policy makes it difficult for the United States to assist insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts over the long term. The insurgency in Nicaragua and counterinsurgency in El Salvador were examples of this problem in 1987.

The conference developed several specific policy recommendations which are contained in the preface to the book. These recommendations, while generally beyond the scope of this thesis, are listed below because Special Forces is involved either directly or indirectly in each recommendation. These recommendations were: (1) The need for better education of key decision makers on the multiple political-military dimensions of protracted warfare and the fostering of

greater intra-agency coordination; (2) The necessity for a balancing of policy objectives and the necessary resources, including force structures, psychological operations capabilities, command, control, communications, and intelligence assets, and the development of weapons systems for low-intensity conflict; (3) There was a requirement to establish priorities for future United States involvement in low-intensity conflicts; (4) The early identification of emerging threats in key regions of the Third World was necessary so that countermeasures could be implemented prior to the commitment of significant United States resources; (5) Strengthening of existing programs so that security, economic aid, and other kinds of assistance could be provided to allies well before a revolutionary insurgency became a critical threat to the stability of a friendly government; (6) If the United States was to continue to be involved with insurgent and resistance movements, it would need to develop the means to assist them in establishing political-military structures and strategies that could effectively prosecute a protracted political-military strategy. In conclusion, Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency states that the development of appropriate doctrinal, strategic, operational, and leadership programs within the military services and civilian agencies must evolve if policy is to be implemented.<sup>18</sup>

These two books, Special Operations and US Strategy and Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, are not for general reading. Only someone deeply interested in Special Operations and its role in US foreign policy should read these books.

A past (General James J. Lindsay) and current commander (General Carl W. Stiner) of the United States Special Operations Command have written several articles on the strategic importance of Special Operation Forces. General Lindsay's article "Low-Intensity Conflict Risks Increase," in the May/June *Defense 90* states that Special Operation Forces "may be assigned objectives that lead directly to the accomplishment of national or theater-level political, economic or psychological objectives."<sup>19</sup> He further asserts that Special Operations Forces need to be equipped, trained and organized to achieve the capability to accomplish these strategic missions. General Lindsay concludes his article by stating that, with the breakdown of East-West confrontation, Special Operations Forces are especially well suited to deal with the rapidly changing world and the accomplishment of our national strategy objectives.

General Stiner's article "The Strategic Employment of Special Operations Forces" in the June 1991 *Military Review* describes the strategic and operational use of Special Operations Forces and the role of Special Operations Forces in national strategy. General Stiner states that in order to support our national strategy, the United States military must maintain two capabilities. These are the ability to counter violent acts that may threaten the United States or its interests and the ability to offer nation assistance. General Stiner believes that Special Operations Forces proved their ability to perform the former in Operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Shield/Storm*. For the latter ability General Stiner believes that

In concert with other elements of US strategy, SOF can, and should, be an effective instrument for achieving US

objectives around the world. SOF has an essential role to play in responding to the emerging national security challenges that will confront the United States into the next century.<sup>20</sup>

Numerous students at the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Advanced Operational Fellowship Studies (AOFS), and in the Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) programs have produced monographs and theses relating to Special Operations Forces. Several of the more relevant products are reviewed here.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Todd's 1987 AOFS monograph entitled *Special Operations Forces: Expanding the Mid and High Intensity Battlefield* examines the role of Special Operations Forces, and in particular Special Forces, as a player in the Army's war fighting system as described in AirLand Battle doctrine. Lieutenant Colonel Todd's monograph examines the theoretical basis for the integration of Special Operations Forces into a theater commander's campaign plan. He initially establishes a historical basis for this integration, then investigates the current (1987) Army and joint doctrine for the inclusion of Special Operations Forces into the theater commander's plan for mid- and high-intensity combat.

In his examination of literature he determined that only two useful documents exist on the use of Special Forces. These are FM 100-5, Operations, (1986), which "lays out the role (for Special Operations Forces) thoroughly in Chapter 3"<sup>21</sup> and U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Pamphlet 55-34, Army Operational Concept for Special Operations Forces, which "amplifies the concept of employment of ARSOF, in all levels of war."<sup>22</sup> It is interesting to note that neither the then current doctrinal manual on Special Forces, FM 31-20, Special

Forces Operations, nor the joint manual for Special Forces, Joint Chief of Staff Publication 20, Joint Unconventional Warfare, were considered useful documents. Lieutenant Colonel Todd determines that Special Forces needs an updated, current manual that is compatible with FM 100-5.

In his conclusion Lieutenant Colonel Todd argues that sufficient documentation exists for the integration of Special Operations Forces into the theater commander's campaign planning. He also concludes that Special Operations Forces must not only be included in campaign planning but also in war games at corps level and below. Inclusion is necessary to insure the complete integration of Special Operations Forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, as well as across the complete spectrum of conflict, low-, mid-, and high-intensity.

Major Steve A. Fondacaro's SAMS monograph titled *AirLand Battle and SOF: A Proposal for an Interim Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, completed in May 1989, suggests that AirLand Battle doctrine be used as the interim doctrine for Special Operations Force employment pending the development of approved doctrine for Special Operations Forces. Major Fondacaro uses the four AirLand Battle tenets of agility, depth, initiative, and synchronization and their application or lack there-of in three historical examples of Special Operations Force employment to determine if AirLand Battle doctrine is suitable as an interim doctrine. The three historical examples he uses are the Son Tay raid (Operation KINGPIN) in 1970, the Iran hostage rescue (Operation RICE BOWL) in 1980, and the Israeli raid on the Entebbe airport (Operation THUNDERBOLT) in 1976.

Major Fondacaro states that the United States Special Operations Command, established in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act as a supporting unified command to which all Special Operations Forces from all services are assigned, has several problems to confront in developing doctrine. These problems are as follows: there are few people, active duty or retired, who can honestly call themselves Special Operations Force experts; Special Operations is an area that lacks joint doctrine; and Special Operations is an area in which it has proven most difficult for the military services and other government agencies to clearly define.<sup>23</sup>

He then proceeds to argue that AirLand Battle meets the criteria as both an interim and base doctrine for joint Special Operations: when Special Operations units follow the four AirLand Battle tenets, they succeed. Operation KINGPIN observed the tenets of initiative, agility, and depth but failed in synchronization. The maneuver operation was not synchronized with the intelligence operation because it was known that the prisoners were no longer at the POW camp but the raiders were sent anyway. The operation failed to rescue the prisoners. Operation RICE BOWL followed only one tenet, initiative. It was a total failure. Operation THUNDERBOLT followed all four tenets and was a smashing success.

In his conclusion Major Fondacaro states that AirLand Battle is not the definitive answer to Special Operations Force doctrine. He believes that using it as an interim doctrine is much better than having no doctrine at all. He also believes that AirLand Battle doctrine should

be used as a guide in doctrinal development because it is joint oriented and forward looking.

Major Gordon C. Bonham's 1991 SAMS monograph, *Special Operations Forces: The Combination Tool in the CINC's Operational Toolbox*, examines the utility of Special Operations Forces for use by the theater Commander-in-Chief in war and operations short of war, across the operational continuum. Major Bonham states that in war the political restraints are minimal; therefore, the Commander-in-Chief can employ overwhelming combat power, across time and space to accomplish his goals. In operations short of war, however, the political restrictions are much greater, and his ability to accomplish his goals is correspondingly decreased.

Major Bonham argues that Special Operations Forces provide the Commander-in-Chief the ability to accomplish his goals across the operational continuum. During war, Special Operations Forces exploit enemy weaknesses and, acting as a combat multiplier for conventional forces, set conditions for operational success. During operations short of war, in which the use of conventional forces is constrained by political restrictions, Special Operations Forces provide the Commander-in-Chief means to accomplish strategic ends for his theater. Major Bonham concludes that as the political influence along the operational continuum increases, the application of Special Operations Forces increases and the capability to use conventional forces decreases.

Major Glenn M. Harned's 1985 MMAS thesis, *Army Special Operations Forces and AirLand Battle*, is a superb work. Major Harned's research hypothesis is that the 1984 Army Special Operations Forces



Operational Concept (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-34, 26 July 1984) is inconsistent with AirLand Battle doctrine and therefore must be rewritten to reflect this doctrine. Major Harned conducts an exhaustive analysis of all factors relating to the Special Operations Forces operational concept and AirLand Battle. He concludes that his research hypothesis is correct, and he advances a revision for the operational concept to make it conform to AirLand Battle doctrine.

It is interesting to note that the Special Operations Forces operational concept was the best Special Operations Forces doctrine document at that time in relating Special Forces to AirLand Battle. The then current Special Forces manual was published in 1977 and was completely inconsistent with AirLand Battle. This is not surprising since AirLand Battle doctrine did not exist in the Army until the 1982 FM 100-5.

While this author agrees with Major Harned's conclusion, there were many things that were right about the Special Operations Forces operational concept. The alleviation of inconsistencies within the operational concept that Major Harned recommends would make the operational concept compatible with AirLand Battle doctrine.

Many of Major Harned's other findings are also shared by this author. The assertion that is most pertinent to this thesis is that the

primary strategic mission for Army SOF should be theater deep battle in support of the theater interdiction campaign, that Army SOF may also perform deep battle and rear battle missions in direct support of operational level land and air commanders, and that tactical missions are inappropriate for Army SOF except under special circumstances.<sup>24</sup>

Anyone interested in the status of Special Forces doctrine in 1985 and anyone interested in how the doctrines of the Army's major functional

areas must be compatible with the Army's doctrinal concept must read Major Harned's MMAS thesis.

### History of Special Forces

A review of several books on the history of Special Forces is required to provide the reader some basic knowledge on what has occurred in Special Forces since its inception in 1952. While the following review in no way exhausts all that has been written on Special Forces, it provides the reader with a frame of reference for this thesis.

Any study of the United States Army Special Forces must begin with Colonel Aaron Bank's book, From OSS to Green Berets. Colonel Bank is rightfully called the father of Special Forces. From OSS to Green Berets is his personal story from duty in World War II as an OSS agent to turning over command of the 10th Special Forces Group in Bad Tölz, West Germany in 1954.

Colonel Bank makes the determined and very important point that Special Forces should, and must, trace its beginning to the OSS. In chapter 9, "In the UW Saddle Again", and chapter 10, "Riding High", Colonel Bank describes the administrative and bureaucratic fight to establish Special Forces in the U.S. Army. It is interesting and instructive to hear how he describes determined efforts to bring about the birth of Special Forces and how he was able to separate the Ranger mission from the Special Forces mission. This problem to some extent continues today.

Colonel Charles M. Simpson III writes an excellent history of Special Forces in his book Inside the Green Berets, the First Thirty Years. Colonel Simpson is well qualified to write a history of Special Forces,

having been a battalion commander, deputy commander of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam, and commander of the 1st Special Forces Group. Colonel Simpson traces the evolution of Special Forces from its strictly unconventional warfare force during the 1950s, through its counterinsurgency period during the Vietnam War, to the multiple mission role of today's Special Forces. Inside the Green Berets, even though it was written before From OSS to Green Beret, makes a superb two-volume history of Special Forces. Simpson's final chapter, "The Future of Special Forces," is a thought provoking conclusion. It provides an interesting flavor for the feel, concerns, and hopes of Special Forces in the early 1980s.

Lieutenant Colonel Ian D. W. Sutherland writes a good history of Special Forces in Special Forces of the United States Army, 1952/1982. While this book is not of the caliber of Inside the Green Berets, it makes interesting reading. The casual reader would, in fact, probably find Special Forces of the United States Army easier to read than Simpson's book because Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland provides much more than a history of Special Forces. In addition to his chapter on the history of Special Forces he includes chapters on organization (though somewhat outdated), selection and training, uniforms and insignia, and equipment. For anyone wanting a general view of Special Forces, Special Forces of the United States Army is it.

U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins by Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. is an in-depth history of the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952. One of Colonel Paddock's central themes is that, except for a few strong-willed Army officers, mainly Major General Robert

A. McClure (who was Colonel Bank's boss), it was the initiative of influential civilians in urging conservative Army leaders to move into a new and uncertain field that led to the United States development of a special warfare capability.

Colonel Paddock delineates two major points in his book. The first is

Contrary to the official lineage of Special Forces, unconventional warfare, in its strictest definition, did not have a traceable formal history in the Army. The Office of Strategic Services, to which the Army contributed personnel in World War II, was the first American agency devoted to the planning, direction, and conduct of unconventional warfare, but it was not a military organization.<sup>25</sup>

Second, in the face of resistance, both within the Army and from the Air Force and CIA, Special Forces, nonetheless, became a reality. However, because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and a tradition -- and Special Forces had neither -- it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the control of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare.<sup>26</sup>

U.S. Army Special Warfare. Its Origins is not for the general reader. Only someone who is deeply interested in the origins of Special Forces should read this book.

Numerous books have been written about the Special Forces involvement in the Vietnam War. Shelby L. Stanton's Green Berets at War. U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 "represents the only authoritative and detailed Special Forces battlefield history of the Vietnam War."<sup>27</sup> Shelby Stanton served with Special Forces during the Vietnam War with the 46th Special Forces Company in Lopburi, Thailand. Mr. Stanton begins his account of Special Forces' involvement

in Asia with the activation of the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment in 1956 in Hawaii. He describes in detail the activation of the 1st Special Forces Group at Camp Drake, Japan and the early commitments in Asia and Southeast Asia. He provides an easily followed, interesting, and informative progression of events from Laos to the beginning Vietnam involvement, and to full US participation in the Vietnam war. Mr. Stanton, as suggested by the title, does not limit his book to the Vietnam War. He covers the entire spectrum of Special Forces participation, and his book is necessary for any study of Special Forces.

Colonel Francis J. Kelly's book The Green Berets in Vietnam 1961-71 published in 1991, is much more restricted in its history of Special Forces. Colonel Kelly, The commander of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, first wrote the book under the title U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971 in 1973 as part of the US Army Vietnam Studies program. Colonel Kelly concentrates his study on the 5th Group's counterinsurgency efforts during the period 1966 to 1969. He does however, discuss several of the projects of the 5th Group that involved special reconnaissance and special operations/direct action missions. His explanation of the future of Special Forces, while brief, is right to the point.

Peter Macdonald's book The Special Forces looks like a propaganda and recruiting picture book for Special Forces. While its large color photographs add to this impression, the book contains a short synopsis of the history of Special Forces, Vietnam, and the capabilities of Special Forces at the time of publication. This book is recommended for

the reader who wants an introduction to Special Forces and desires a comparison with the elite units of other countries. Leroy Thompson's photo-book US Special Forces 1941-1987 is a photograph album with no real purpose except for entertainment. Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors by Hans Halberstadt, is similar in appearance to Peter Macdonald's but far superior. With focus on the Army Reserve 3rd Battalion, 12th Special Forces Group, Mr. Halberstadt provides an interesting personal look at Special Forces. His chapter 6, "After Action Review: The History of UW," provides a short, accurate history of Special Forces.

The January 1988 *Defense Update* includes several articles on the revitalization of Special Operations Forces. While it deals with all Special Operations Forces and not just Army Special Forces, it provides information that shows the important reemergence of special operations in the United States military. The article "Revitalization of Special Operations" is particularly informative.

#### Army Doctrine

The Army's primary doctrinal manual, Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, is the basic manual for how the Army fights. It sets forth the fundamental concepts for all Army doctrine and serves as the foundation for what is taught in Army service schools. It also guides training and combat developments throughout the Army. As such it serves as the Army capstone (or keystone depending on the year) document on doctrine in the Army. Therefore, past FM 100-5s are reviewed, from 1976 to the current manual 1986, to provide some historical perspective. The draft FM 100-5 is reviewed last.

The 1976 FM 100-5, referred to here as the '76 manual, focuses only on the tactical level of war (in fact only at division level and below) and is written to tell the Army how to win the *first* battle of a war in Central Europe. In describing future battle, it states that the

Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations.<sup>28</sup>

The manual does, however, state that the principles outlined in it apply to other theaters as well.

The '76 manual constantly stresses defense as the preferred method of combat and is well known for delineating the doctrine of the Active Defense. In describing the offense it gives the commander the impression that he should only go on the offense as the last resort. It states that the commander must understand the advantages that the defender has and recognize that his initial losses will be very high. Additionally,

If a commander fighting outnumbered estimates the cost of success to be high, he should attack *only if he expects the eventual outcome to result in decisively greater enemy losses than his own, or result in the capture of objectives crucial to the outcome of the larger battle.*<sup>29</sup>

In further emphasizing defense, the '76 manual states,

While it is generally true that the outcome of combat derives from the results of offensive operations, it may frequently be necessary, even advisable, to defend. Indeed, the defender enjoys many advantages . . . . In fact, the defender has every advantage but one - he does not have the initiative.<sup>30</sup>

The '76 manual concerns itself only with the close fight. It does not mention fighting the enemy outside of the immediate battle area and

therefore, the assumption is that the enemy will reach the main defenses without being seriously weakened. In discussing the counterattack, the main means of regaining the initiative in the defense, it states,

Counterattacks should be conducted only when the gains to be achieved are worth the risks involved in surrendering the innate advantages of the defender. Because counter-attacking forces give up most advantages of the defense, . . . limited objective attacks should be the rule rather than the exception.<sup>31</sup>

This is no way to regain the initiative, nor is it the way to get into the enemy's rear.

Finally, the '76 manual does not even mention Special Forces (the term Special Operations Forces was not used during this period). Since Special Forces are not used in the main battle area and are generally theater level assets, this is not surprising. One final note. There is no mention in this manual of either joint or combined operations. While Air-Land battle (not to be confused with AirLand Battle doctrine) is mentioned, it is only concerned with close air support, it does not address joint operations as we know them today.

The 1982 FM 100-5, the '82 manual, is a much different manual. The first sentence changes the primary mission of the Army. Where the '76 manual states the primary mission of the Army was to win the land battle in Europe, the '82 manual states that the primary mission of the Army is to deter war. In addition to this major change it also changes the description of the doctrine. The '76 manual describes FM 100-5 as capstone doctrine, while the '82 manual describes FM 100-5 as keystone doctrine. The more appropriate word is keystone.

While there are many differences between the two manuals, which will be covered later, there are two major changes between the '76



and '82 manuals. The first difference is the inclusion of the operational level of war in the '82 manual. The second difference is the emphasis on the offense.

The '82 manual describes the three levels of war as the strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level is described as the employment of the armed forces "to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force."<sup>32</sup>

The operational level of war is described as the level of war which "uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. . . . It is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns."<sup>33</sup> It further states that "Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles."<sup>34</sup>

The tactical level of war is described as the level in which units use tactics to defeat the enemy. Tactics are defined as "the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives."<sup>35</sup>

The levels of war are mutually supporting and overlap. In other words, the tactical war is won to support operational objectives in the same manner that the operational war is won to support strategic objectives. At the same time, strategic objectives must be attainable by operational-level military means and operational-level objectives must be attainable by tactical military means.

The '82 manual stresses offense throughout. On the first page the '82 manual states that to win the commander must retain the

initiative and disrupt the enemy's capability to fight by attacking him in depth with deep attacks, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver. This is the essence of the offense. Even in the defense, the offense is stressed. In describing a successful defense the manual states that the "defense consists of reactive and offensive elements working together to rob the enemy of the initiative. It is never purely reactive. The defender resists and contains the enemy where he must, but seeks every opportunity to turn the tables."<sup>36</sup> This is a complete change from the '76 manual.

The doctrine delineated in the '82 manual is AirLand Battle doctrine. In introducing this doctrine the '82 manual states that AirLand Battle is an

approach to fighting intended to develop the full potential of US forces. Operations based on this doctrine are nonlinear battles which attack enemy forces throughout their depth with fire and maneuver. They require the coordinated action of all available military forces in pursuit of a single objective.

Air and ground maneuver forces; conventional, nuclear and chemical fires; unconventional warfare; active reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition efforts; and electronic warfare will be directed against the forward and rear areas . . . . The AirLand Battle will be dominated by . . . the initiative and, with deep attack and decisive maneuver, destroy its opponent's abilities to fight and to organize in depth.<sup>37</sup>

This introduction makes several important points. The first is the idea that the Army cannot win by itself. It clearly states that all military forces are needed to win, that the next war will be joint. The second is the idea of depth. The enemy will be attacked throughout the entire battlefield, not just in the main battle area. The third is that Special Operations Forces are an integral part of the doctrine, like any other asset available to the commander.

Included in the '82 manual are the principles of war. In fact the principles of war are the foundations for AirLand Battle doctrine. These principles of war are: the objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. These same principles remain one of the foundations of Army Operations doctrine. These principles will be discussed in chapter four.

Also introduced in the '82 manual are the AirLand Battle tenets. To be successful on the battlefield, every commander must follow these tenets. They are initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. These tenets were new to our doctrine at the time and even though they have changed slightly since 1982, they remain a foundation of Army Operations doctrine. The '82 definitions are included here. The '93 definitions and a description of them are contained in chapter four.

**Initiative implies an**

offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or to retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance.<sup>38</sup>

Depth refers to time, distance, and resources. Commanders have to use the entire depth of the battlefield to strike the enemy and to prevent him from concentrating his firepower or maneuvering his forces to a point of his choice. Depth of resources refers to the men, weapon systems, and materiel that provide the commander with flexibility. The battle in depth should delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's uncommitted forces and isolate his committed forces so they can be destroyed.<sup>39</sup>

Agility "requires flexible organizations and quick-minded, flexible leaders *who can act faster than the enemy*. They must know of critical events as they occur and act to avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy vulnerabilities."<sup>40</sup>

Synchronization "results from an all-prevading (sic) unity of effort throughout the force. There can be no waste. Every action of every element must flow from understanding the higher commander's concept."<sup>41</sup>

Additionally, combat imperatives were introduced in the '82 manual. These imperatives are listed here but the definitions are left out because they are basically self-explanatory. The seven imperatives are: insure unity of effort, direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, designate and sustain the main effort, sustain the fight, move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly, use terrain and weather, and protect the force. While this list seems common sense, it would be expanded in the next FM 100-5.

The '76 manual included areas of the battlefield that commanders at different levels had to "see" in order to fight their fight. These areas were called captain's area, colonel's area and general's area. The captain's area was from zero to five kilometers to his front and included the zone of direct fire weapons. The colonel's area was from zero to fifty kilometers to his front and included the zone of indirect fire weapons. The general's area was from zero to one hundred and fifty kilometers to his front and included the zone of tactical reinforcement. The '82 manual changed these zones to areas of influence and areas of interest. The area of influence is the area in which the commander fights

the current battle. The area of interest is the area that the commander monitors so that he is aware of enemy actions that might effect future operations. Commanders at every level have an area of influence and an area of interest. The area of influence and area of interest are much more useful to a commander than is the finite piece of ground described in the '76 manual.

The '82 manual makes a good basic attempt at battle planning and coordination. Introduced but not clearly delineated is what is now known as the battlefield operating systems. Mentioned in this section of the manual is Special Forces. Special Operations Forces was still not in use at that time. Special Forces are referred to in their unconventional warfare role and how they support the conventional, tactical level commander. The '82 manual states, "Their greatest value to commanders of conventional forces is in fighting the deep battle and forcing the enemy to deploy significant numbers of combat forces to counter these activities."<sup>42</sup> While this statement is correct, it does not clearly address the employment of Special Forces and their total contribution to winning the land war. It is, however, certainly an improvement over the '76 manual.

In conclusion, how the Army fights as described in the '82 manual is a vast improvement over the '76 manual. The '76 manual, the Active Defense, was a doctrine for failure. AirLand Battle is doctrine for success. For Special Forces, the '82 manual was also an improvement, but a great amount of work still needed to be done.

The 1986 version of FM 100-5, the '86 manual, reaffirmed AirLand Battle and expanded this doctrine to bring it up-to-date and to

correct some misunderstandings from the '82 version. The '86 version builds on the joint nature of the '82 manual and more clearly defines the operational and tactical levels of war.

The joint nature of this manual is evident in the first paragraph. It states,

The overriding mission of US *forces* is to deter war. The US Army *supports* that mission by *providing* combat ready units to the unified and specified commands which are charged with executing the military policies of the United States and waging war should deterrence fail (emphasis added).<sup>43</sup>

The levels of war are more clearly defined by referring to them by their level of execution. Military strategy is defined as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force."<sup>44</sup> Operational art is "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."<sup>45</sup> Tactics is defined as "the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements."<sup>46</sup>

Engagements, battles, major operations, and campaigns are also defined but in essence build on each other, with engagements being the smallest, and campaigns being the largest. In addition to providing clearer definitions, the '86 manual is much better at explaining how to plan and execute operations at each level. One complete chapter is dedicated for this purpose.

The tenets of AirLand Battle - initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization - remain the same but synchronization is better defined. Synchronization became "the arrangement of battlefield activities in time,

space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point."<sup>47</sup>

The number of AirLand Battle imperatives has been increased and the individual imperatives have been expanded. The ten imperatives are: ensure unity of effort, anticipate events on the battlefield, concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, designate, sustain, and shift the main effort, press the fight, move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly, use terrain, weather, deception, and operational security, conserve strength for decisive action, combine arms and sister services to complement and reinforce, and understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders. These imperatives will not be defined.

The '86 manual also changed the name and expanded the description of the area of influence introduced in the '82 manual. The area of influence was changed to the area of operations and is the specific area or sector assigned to a unit, not just the area of the close battle as in the '82 manual.

The battlefield framework introduced in the '82 manual is also expanded and better explained. The concepts of close, deep, and rear operations are also better defined. Close operations involve the fight between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserves of both combatants. Deep operations are directed against enemy forces in depth that threaten the success of the mission. Such operations are conducted to limit the enemy's freedom of action, isolate the close fight, and alter the tempo in favor of friendly forces. Rear operations conserve

the commander's freedom of action and assure uninterrupted support for the battle.<sup>48</sup>

Offensive operations are also more clearly defined, with an emphasis on explaining the operational level of war. This area was missing from the '82 manual. The concepts of the culminating point and the center of gravity are used when describing operational art in offensive warfare. Culminating point is a Clausewitzian term which is defined as the point at which the

force on the offensive expends so much of its strength that it ceases to hold an advantage over the enemy. At that point the attacker either halts to avoid operating at a disadvantage or goes on and risks becoming weaker than the defender.<sup>49</sup>

The center of gravity is also a Clausewitzian term which is defined as the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."<sup>50</sup> At the operational level of war, the focus of offensive operations should be directed toward the enemy's center of gravity while insuring that friendly forces never reach their culminating point.

Defensive operations are also more clearly defined at the operational level. In the defense the focus of effort should be directed at making the enemy reach his culminating point as quickly as possible, while at the same time protecting one's own center of gravity.

Introduced for the first time in the '86 manual are the concepts of high-, mid-, and low-intensity conflict. These terms are not well liked in the Army but they retain currency. Because of this, their description is provided for general understanding. High- and mid-intensity conflict battlefields are likely to be "chaotic, intense, and highly destructive. They will probably extend across a wider space of air, land, and sea than previously experienced."<sup>51</sup> Low-intensity conflict is described as falling



below the level of high- and mid-intensity operations and will pit Army forces against irregular or unconventional forces, enemy special operations forces, and terrorists. LIC poses a threat to US interests at all times, not just in periods of active hostilities.<sup>52</sup>

As concerns Special Operations Forces, the '86 manual is again an improvement over the '82 manual. Special Operations Forces are introduced early in the manual, page 2, and are discussed throughout the entire spectrum of conflict and at all levels of war. Special Operations Forces and all of the Special Operations Force missions are mentioned as assets to accomplish the mission of winning the conflict. In particular, Special Operations Forces are listed as a major functional area when planning and executing at the operational and tactical levels of war. In this portion of the manual only the mission of unconventional warfare is discussed in any detail, while the other missions of special reconnaissance and direct action are described but not specifically stated.

In conclusion, the '86 manual is a continuation of the AirLand Battle doctrine described in the '82 manual. The '86 manual clarifies some of the confusing areas of the '82 manual and expands on areas that were weak. The '86 manual also makes some significant improvements in describing the abilities and uses of Special Operations Forces. The '86 manual is a superb document that has served the Army well.

The 1993 final draft of FM 100-5, the '93 manual, asserts the need to update Army doctrine in the prologue. It states,

The 1993 doctrine reflects where our thinking has taken us in a new strategic era. It recognizes that the Cold War has ended and the nature of the threat, hence the strategy of the United States as well, has changed. This doctrine reflects the

shift to stronger joint operations prompted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; . . . . It extends AirLand Battle into a wider interservice integration, allows for the increasing incidence of combined operations, and recognizes that Army forces operate across the spectrum of war and operations other than war.<sup>53</sup>

This need for change is evident throughout the manual. The '93 manual contains two chapters that have not been present in any of the FM 100-5s reviewed. These chapters are "Force Projection" and "Operations Other Than War." Also evident is the division of joint and combined arms into two separate chapters. Not only are these two chapters separated but the discussion of each is expanded and they are covered in more detail than in previous manuals.

Chapter one is much different than the same chapter in the '86 manual. Chapter one describes the challenges facing the Army and how they have changed, reflecting changes in the world since 1986. Also in this chapter is the linkage between the United States National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the Army's role in them. The purpose of the Army is also delineated in this chapter. While some of the words have changed, the purpose has not.

The fundamentals of Army Operations have also changed. This manual discusses not only war, as have the other FM 100-5s, but also operations other than war. In describing operations other than war the '93 manual states,

The US promotes the self-development of nations through the engagement of US resources and assistance. The military--particularly the Army--performs important roles in this arena. The prime focus of the Army is warfighting--the use of force--yet the Army's frequent role in operations other than war is critical. Use of Army forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict . . . .

Hostile forces, however, may seek to provoke a crisis or otherwise defeat our purpose by creating a conflict. At the point where diplomatic influence alone fails to resolve the conflict, persuasion may be required, and the US could enter a more intense environment in which it uses the military to pursue its aims.<sup>54</sup>

The '93 manual also describes two types of war, limited and general. Limited war is described as armed conflict short of a general war while general war is war between major powers that requires the full resources of the two sides.

The foundations of Army Operations have remained the same, the principles of war and the tenets. There has been some change though in the principles and the tenets. Two of the principles, unity of command and mass, have changed some and there is now a fifth tenet, versatility. Additionally, the discussion of the tenets also includes their application to operations other than war. The '93 manual also introduces the principles of operations other than war. The principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, and the tenets are discussed in detail in chapter four.

Following the tenets the '93 manual discusses the dynamics of combat power. The four elements of combat power are: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The elements have not changed but protection has been expanded from the '86 manual. The first two components, protect the force from enemy maneuver and firepower and keep soldiers healthy and morale high have not changed. There are two added components, safety and prevent fratricide. These components are self-explanatory and will not be discussed. The important point is that they have been added, reflecting a sensitivity to recent operations.

New in the '93 manual are the combat functions. These functions are intelligence, maneuver, firepower, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command. The combat functions are very close to the battlefield operating systems first alluded to in the '82 manual. The battlefield operating systems are used throughout the Army and how they apply to Special Forces is discussed in the review of the '90 Special Forces manual. It is important here that the Army has finally introduced something very similar to them in its keystone doctrine. The combat functions are used by the commander to functionally synchronize the battlefield by integrating and coordinating these functions.

The '86 manual listed Special Operations Forces as a major functional area in describing the forces available to the commander. While this was a major improvement over previous manuals, it did not go far enough. The '93 manual changes this. While FM 100-5 recognizes three general types of forces, armored, light, and Special Operations Forces, it rightfully describes Army Special Operations Forces under the subtitle "Joint Capabilities and Missions."

This version of FM 100-5, for the first time, correctly describes the five types of Army Special Operations Force units and correctly describes the missions of Special Forces. It states, "Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) have five types of units: Special Forces (SF), rangers, Army special operations aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs(CA)."<sup>55</sup> And Special Forces are "organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. They have four primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action,

and special reconnaissance. Certain special forces units conduct counterterrorism as a primary mission."<sup>56</sup>

The missions of Special Operations Forces are clearly stated and are quoted here in some detail to show how "right" the manual is. It states,

Special operations occur in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas across the full range of Army operations. In operations other than war, they may substitute for the commitment of general-purpose military forces . . . .

The theater SOF commander normally executes special operations as part of the theater commander's joint special operations effort. Preestablished command arrangements usually determine how the combatant commander assigns missions to his SOF. SOF can also provide support to tactical commanders when their operational areas converge or coincide.

Special operations during war and in other hostile environments usually occur deep in the enemy's rear or in other areas void of conventional maneuver forces. They may also extend into the territory of hostile states adjacent to the theater. While each special operations action may be tactical in nature, its effects often contribute directly to theater operational or strategic objectives in support of the theater campaign plan. Special operations may seek either immediate or long-range effects on the conflict.

Typical missions include interdicting enemy lines of communication and destroying military and industrial facilities. SOF detachments may also have missions associated with intelligence collection, target acquisition, terminal guidance for strike aircraft and missile systems, locating weapons of mass destruction, and personnel recovery. These detachments conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) to demoralize the enemy and collect information in the enemy's rear areas. SOF organize, train, equip, and advise resistance forces in guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage. They add depth to the campaign, forcing the enemy to deploy significant combat forces to protect its rear area.

Special operations forces are an invaluable tool across the spectrum of conflict. In peace and war they work with indigenous people in regions of conflict on (sic) support of US national interests. They are also highly capable of unilateral actions of extreme sensitivity. They can be relied upon for

quick, decisive action at long range as well as protracted operations in remote regions of the world.<sup>57</sup>

In discussing Army Special Operations Forces the '93 manual states they are "effective in insurgency and counterinsurgency, contingency operations, and counterterrorism operations. In peacetime, they participate in foreign internal development efforts, humanitarian and civic assistance programs, and in demonstrating US presence in troubled regions."<sup>58</sup> This last quote seems to be in contradiction with the previous quotes. FM 100-5 should specifically state here that Army Special Operations Forces can accomplish all of the missions discussed previously and that they are a valuable asset in war, in operations other than war, and at all levels of war.

Chapter three discusses force projection. While the '86 manual discussed contingency operations, force projection is a much larger topic. Force projection is a necessary requirement for the modern Army while contingency operations remain a type of operation it must perform.

The planning and executing of operations in the '93 manual is similar to the '86 manual. Some of the changes are the introduction of battle space and the importance of conflict termination as it relates to planning for the desired end state.

Battle space is the

physical volume determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and engage the enemy. This volume includes breadth, depth, and height and varies over time, according to the way in which the commander positions and moves his assets. A commander's battle space includes the three-dimensional area in which *friendly* combat power, regardless of whether it is controlled by the commander who has defined the battle space or an adjacent commander . . . .<sup>59</sup>

Battle space does not replace the area of interest as described in the '86 manual. The area of interest is based on enemy capabilities. Battle space is based on friendly capabilities.

Under conflict termination FM 100-5 states.

Knowing when to end a war and how to preserve the objectives for which it was fought is a vital component of campaign design; . . . .

If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the war, the enemy should be both unwilling and unable to resurrect his resistance. Moreover, the strategic aims for which we fought should be secured by the leverage that US and allied forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. They are only successful when such aims are achieved and retained.<sup>60</sup>

As mentioned earlier, one of the major changes in this FM 100-5 is the introduction of operations other than war. Gone are the concepts of high, mid, and low intensity conflicts that have been the targets of much frustration in the Army. The concepts of war and operations other than war are much easier to grasp and understand than are high, mid, and low intensity war. A description of operations other than war was given earlier but the '93 manual further states here that "Operations other than war are intrinsic to a combatant commander's peacetime theater strategy, an ambassador's country plan, or civil assistance at home."<sup>61</sup> In other words, operations other than war occur all the time, they occur everyday.

The '93 manual also introduced the principles of operations other than war. These principles are objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. Three of these principles are also included in the principles of war. Legitimacy, perseverance, and

restraint are new. As mentioned earlier these principles are discussed in detail in chapter four.

The doctrine of the offense and defense missions has changed little from the '86 manual. The doctrine for retrograde even less so. While some of the changes are discussed below, it must be understood that these are not major changes. Since the offense and defense are a major portion of this thesis, they are discussed in detail in chapter four.

The characteristics of the offense have changed from surprise, concentration, speed, flexibility, and audacity to surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. Tempo is a better word to describe a characteristic of the offense, but why is flexibility dropped?

The phases of the offense have changed to the forms of the offense. The preparation phase has also changed to the form of movement to contact. These changes are more a change in semantics because the effects described in the '86 and '93 manuals are the same.

There are even fewer changes in the defense. The characteristics of the defense have changed from preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility to prepared positions, security, disruption, mass and concentration, and flexibility. While preparation has changed to prepared positions, the explanations say the same thing. The changing of concentration to mass and concentration is a good change. It is interesting to note that flexibility is retained as a characteristic of the defense but not the offense.

In conclusion, in some ways the '93 manual has changed significantly from the '86 manual and in some ways it has changed little. The '93 manual has done a good job in reflecting the changes in the



world, in the United States, and the Army and incorporating these changes into the Army's keystone document. The '93 manual has for the first time clearly stated the missions of Special Operations Forces and Special Forces and shown how they contribute to war and operations other than war. Some work still needs to be done but there has been much improvement. The '86 manual has served the Army well, the '93 manual should also.

### Special Forces Doctrine

Special Forces doctrine will be reviewed in a manner similar to Army doctrine. The first manual under consideration is the 1974 Special Forces doctrinal manual. Successive manuals are reviewed in chronological order to give the reader an idea of Special Forces doctrine progression. The two current manuals pertaining to Special Forces, FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, published in 1990, and FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, published in 1991, are reviewed last.

FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations US Army Doctrine, published in 1974, explains in its first paragraph that it "provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of US Army Special Forces."<sup>62</sup> This statement has one major problem. At the time, the main focus of the Army was at division level and below, the tactical level of war. Also during this time, Special Forces was considered a strategic asset. Thus, the manual was not written for use by corps commanders and below, and was therefore, not for general reading throughout the Army. In addition, FM 31-21 had a classified supplement which magnified the problems of a lack of wide

distribution and general reading throughout the Army. This problem became even greater when the reader realizes that, because of the level of employment, Special Forces doctrine was not taught at the standard Army schools. The classification mistake would be compounded in the next manual.

Only two of the current primary Special Forces missions are described in the '74 manual, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, then called Internal Defense and Development. Unconventional warfare is dealt with in sufficient detail. Internal Defense and Development is glossed over and is not clearly understandable. Direct action is talked about but only in the context of supporting the unconventional warfare mission.

The 1974 Special Forces manual served neither the Special Forces community nor the Army. When a revision of FM 100-5 occurred in 1976, the Special Forces manual was updated in 1977.

The 1977 Special Forces manual's number and title are different from the '74 manual. The new number is FM 31-20, and the title is Special Forces Operations. More importantly, this is a classified manual. The implications of this are discussed below.

FM 31-20, the '77 manual, "provides basic concepts of doctrine for US Army Special Forces employment in unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense while operating in a high threat environment."<sup>63</sup> This statement, while consistent with '76 FM 100-5's focus on Central Europe as a high threat area, is contradictory in itself. Most of the Special Forces missions mentioned, with possibly the

exception of special operations, are very difficult if not impossible to conduct in a high threat environment.

Unconventional warfare is better defined than in the '74 manual. It is defined as operations, which include, but are not limited to, guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage, all of which are conducted during periods of peace and war in hostile or politically sensitive territory. Like the '74 manual, the '77 manual does a very good job in describing unconventional warfare.

Special Operations are described as "sensitive actions of a specified nature initiated in the face of an emergency or strategic contingency."<sup>64</sup> This mission is described in some detail but is a large part of the classified portion.

Foreign internal defense is described as the, "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."<sup>65</sup> This definition of foreign internal defense is very general and could be misinterpreted very easily. A better job could have been done in describing the foreign internal defense mission as it pertains to Special Forces.

The '77 manual is basically a good document. It is much better at describing the Special Forces missions and in attempting (but not successfully) to relate the Special Forces mission to the Army doctrine of the time.

The '77 manual replaced four manuals. This was an attempt to consolidate all of the Special Forces doctrine in one manual. In doing this the writers had to classify the manual. This only worsened Army-

wide distribution and knowledge dissemination, a trend started in the '74 manual. A review of this manual suggests two things which defy logic. First, much of the manual is unclassified and therefore should have been available for Army wide distribution. Second, much of what was classified did not appear to warrant the classification. This "over classification" complicated issues of general distribution and access that began with the '74 manual. Classification restricted the ability of any soldier wanting to find out how Special Forces operates to read about it.

This was the last manual on Special Forces operations prior to the current manual published in 1990. Therefore, from at least 1974, Special Forces operational doctrine had been out of the main stream of Army doctrine, distribution, and knowledge. This shortcoming would be corrected with the publication of the 1990 FM 31-20.

The current Special Forces doctrinal manual is FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. This manual varies greatly with the 1977 manual. Two of the most important differences are stated in the preface. The first and most obvious is that it is unclassified. It is unclassified to "ensure its Armywide dissemination and the integration of SF into the Army's systems."<sup>66</sup> The implications of this are immense. For the first time since 1977 the basic doctrine for Special Forces was readily available to every commander and soldier in the Army, thereby easing access for the integration of Special Forces throughout the Army. The second important difference is the direct link between doctrinal principles found in FM 31-20 and those found in FMs 100-5 and 100-20. This manual is the first since at least 1974 directly linking Special Forces doctrine to the Army as a whole.

The purpose of FM 31-20 is clearly stated in the preface. It describes the "roles, missions, capabilities, organization, command and control, employment, and support across the operational continuum and at all levels of war."<sup>67</sup> FM 31-20 also provides the foundation for subordinate Special Forces doctrine and is to be used by commanders and trainers at all levels to plan and conduct training.

Chapter one, "Overview of Special Forces Operations," provides the foundation for the doctrine explained in the manual. It states that Special Forces operations are an integral part of the broader category of Special Operations. Chapter one: provides an overview of the strategic environment; defines and describes the nature of Special Operations; and discusses the principles governing the design and execution of Special Operations. Chapter one also defines and discusses Special Forces roles in peace, conflict, and war.

This overview of Special Forces operations had not appeared in either the '74 manual or the '77 manual. Knowledge of how Special Forces operations fits into the Army is vital to understanding and appreciating the basis for, and the foundation of, Special Forces doctrine. The overview is the most important aspect of the '90 manual and is therefore reviewed in some detail below.

According to FM 31-20, the strategic environment dictates that the United States military forces must think in terms of conducting military operations across the operational continuum. The operational continuum comprises three conditions: peace, conflict, and war.

Peace is the "nonmilitary competition between states and other organized parties."<sup>68</sup> During peacetime, the military element of national

power supports the other three elements of national power, diplomatic, economic, and informational, by preventing and deterring conflict and war.

Conflict is defined as a "politico-military struggle short of conventional armed hostility between states or other organized parties."<sup>69</sup> Conflicts are often protracted and are generally confined to a specific region, but they may have global implications. During conflicts military power is often used indirectly but may be used directly in short duration contingency operations with limited objectives. Conventional and Special Operations Forces can be used for these operations. Low intensity conflict is described here as a United States perspective of a conflict. FM 31-20 states, "The term suggests that the same conflict does not directly threaten US vital national interests. Another party to the conflict may consider it a struggle for national survival. From the US perspective, LIC includes the active support of parties to a conflict."<sup>70</sup>

War, whether "declared or undeclared, is defined as conventional, unconventional, or nuclear armed action between states or organized parties."<sup>71</sup> War may include all or part of the actions used in a conflict. It may also be general, involving all of the resources of nations fighting for national survival, or more commonly, limited, with restraints on objectives and resources. The same war may be limited for one side but general for the other side.

Special Operations Forces are "those forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct SO activities or provide direct support to other SOF."<sup>72</sup> Special Operations are further defined as actions conducted by Special Operations Forces and "paramilitary forces

to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by nonconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas."<sup>73</sup> Special Operations usually differ from conventional operations, operations conducted by general purpose forces, "in their degree of risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence upon operational intelligence and indigenous assets."<sup>74</sup>

FM 31-20 then discusses the principles of war as they apply to Special Operations Forces. The principles of war are also a foundation for Special Operations Forces doctrine but because of the nature of Special Operations, they must be applied differently. The application of the principles of war is discussed in chapter four.

Similar to the '82 and '86 FM 100-5s, FM 31-20 contains Special Operations imperatives which prescribe operational requirements and also form a foundation for Special Operations Force doctrine. The imperatives are only listed here as they are discussed fully in chapter four. The Special Operations imperatives are: recognize political implications, facilitate interagency activities, engage the threat discriminately, consider long-term effects, ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations, anticipate and control psychological effects, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, ensure long-term sustainment, provide sufficient intelligence, and balance security and synchronization.

The Army uses the seven battlefield operating systems to analyze and integrate its activities in units at corps level and below. Special Forces also explains their functions in the terms of the battlefield

operating systems so they are understandable to the conventional Army. Special Forces units, however, usually focus on functions performed by joint and combined forces at echelons above corps in a theater of operations. Because of this Special Forces must apply the battlefield operating systems differently.

Special Forces use the intelligence battlefield operating system in ways similar to conventional forces. However, unique demands are placed on the Special Forces intelligence system because Special Forces commanders generally require theater and national level intelligence systems to perform their mission. The Special Forces intelligence system must also be able to provide near-real-time strategic intelligence down to the lowest tactical level.

The Special Forces maneuver battlefield operating system includes the operational detachments and their indigenous combat forces, when applicable. Army, Navy, and Air Force transportation assets provide Special Forces teams the mobility to infiltrate and exfiltrate into their operational areas. Once employed, the battalion and group commander direct and synchronize the activities of the independent teams. Employed teams use either their own mobility or indigenous transportation to maneuver within their operational area.

The fire support battlefield operating system is somewhat different for Special Forces. The primary fire support system for Special Forces is the terminal guidance capabilities of the operational detachments. Operational detachments do not have organic fire support and are generally beyond the range of field artillery and close air support. Special Forces commanders must coordinate fire support at a much



higher level than does the conventional commander. When working with indigenous combat forces, the Special Forces commander may have organic fire support assets. In addition, the Special Forces commander may receive dedicated fire support assets for certain foreign internal defense and direct action missions.

All Special Forces operations have psychological implications. Therefore psychological operations are considered a major subsystem of the fire support battlefield operating system. Special Forces commanders routinely employ psychological operations against hostile, neutral, and friendly target audiences. The Special Forces psychological operations subsystem includes the planners and coordinators in the psychological operations staff elements, the producers and disseminators in attached and supporting psychological operations units, and all operational detachment members.<sup>75</sup>

The fourth battlefield operating system is air defense. Special Forces units employ passive air defense measures to protect themselves, since they have no organic air defense assets. Special Forces units rely on theater air defense systems to provide active protection for their bases.

The fifth battlefield operating system of mobility/countermobility/survivability is similar to the air defense battlefield operating system. Special Forces units must rely on outside assets to perform this battlefield operating system. When operational detachments work with an indigenous force, they must employ this battlefield operating system and the air defense battlefield operating system in a

manner similar to conventional forces if the indigenous force has these capabilities.

The last two battlefield operating systems are combat service support and command and control. The Special Forces systems for combat service support and command and control perform the same functions as they do for conventional forces. One subsystem of the combat service support battlefield operating system that is of greater importance in Special Forces operations is civil-military operations. Civil-military operations influence every aspect of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions. The civil-military operations subsystem is not treated differently between conventional military and Special Forces operations; the difference lies in influence and importance.

After the explanation of Special Operations in general, FM 31-20 discusses Special Forces in particular. Special Forces is described as a component of Army Special Operations Forces which "plans, conducts, and supports Special Operations in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war."<sup>76</sup> Special Forces operations are almost always joint, incorporating at least one other United States military service; they are many times combined, with the participation of at least one other country; and/or involve another agency of the United States government. In addition, Special Forces may support or be supported by general purpose forces. The role of Special Forces depends on the environment and the level of activity.<sup>77</sup>

Special Forces roles in peace, conflict, and war are covered next. In peacetime, Special Forces retains both a preventive and a deterrent

role. In a preventive role, Special Forces participate in foreign internal defense and development efforts along with other programs to improve conditions in friendly countries. In a deterrent role, Special Forces maintain capabilities that help convince hostile powers to respect United States interests and to refrain from acts of aggression and coercion. Many Special Forces training missions conducted in peacetime have "real world" significance. They provide a presence, demonstrate a commitment, and/or contribute to collective security.<sup>78</sup>

In conflict, Special Forces provide the National Command Authority with options for the discriminate use of force which can preclude or limit the need to use conventional combat forces. The low visibility of Special Forces operations also helps the United States and its allies in maintaining diplomatic flexibility. Additionally, Special Forces operations allow friendly, neutral, and hostile powers to accept the outcome of an operation because they avoid the publicity of the more obvious use of conventional military forces.<sup>79</sup>

During conflicts, Special Forces may conduct foreign internal defense missions to support a friendly government against an insurgency. Special Forces may also conduct unconventional warfare missions to support an insurgency or other armed resistance organization that wants to overthrow a foreign power that is hostile to United States interests. In the latter case, indirect support from a friendly territory is the norm. Special Forces may also conduct direct action and special reconnaissance missions in support of contingency operations during a conflict.

In war Special Forces can "perform its missions at the strategic, operational, or tactical level to influence deep, close, or rear operations. However, the primary role of SF is to conduct and support deep operations beyond the forward limits of conventional military forces."<sup>80</sup>

At the strategic level Special Forces missions focus on the long-term capacity of the hostile power. This strategic role has two aspects. One is to pursue national strategic objectives, and the other is to pursue theater strategic military objectives.

In contributing to the national strategic objectives Special Forces may conduct any or all of their missions. Special Forces may be used in denied territories to

- Collect and report information of national strategic importance.
- Develop and support insurgencies in the hostile power's strategic rear.
- Disrupt the economy.
- Protect friendly strategic LOC(s) threatened by hostile regimes in the theater's strategic rear.
- Accomplish other missions with decisive strategic implications but with no *near-term* effect on conventional military operations.<sup>81</sup>

In pursuit of theater strategic military objectives the unified commander may employ Special Forces to perform special reconnaissance missions to identify hostile capabilities, intentions, and activities. Special Forces may also be used to delay, disrupt, or harass the enemy's strategic second-echelon forces to alter the momentum and tempo of enemy operations, and to prevent the enemy from conducting continuous theater strategic operations. Special Forces may also conduct strategic economy of force missions in a secondary theater.<sup>82</sup>

At the operational level Special Forces conducts deep operations that have a "near-term effect on current theater operations."<sup>83</sup> Deep operations conducted against enemy operational follow-on forces disrupts their combined arms operations and break their momentum, thereby creating opportunities for decisive friendly action in the close operation. At the operational level Special Forces can also:

- Collect and report military information of operational significance.
- Screen an operational land force commander's open flank.
- Attack or secure (for limited periods) critical facilities of operational significance.
- Divert hostile forces from the main effort.<sup>84</sup>

At the tactical level Special Forces supports, and is supported by, conventional forces when their operational areas converge. These operational areas converge generally in the area of deep operations but may converge in rear and close areas.

Special Forces can conduct rear area operations to support security forces, especially when operating in liberated or occupied territory. Special Forces can also support rear area operations by providing advisory assistance to host nation security forces in a foreign internal defense mission.

Special Forces are generally unsuitable for fluid close operations because such operations rely on detailed planning and preparation. However, Special Forces may conduct direct action or special reconnaissance missions in support of close operations if the target has strategic or operational significance.

Once hostilities end Special Forces can play an important role in post-hostility operations. Special Forces operational detachments can perform security assistance and foreign internal defense missions to

facilitate the redeployment of conventional forces. These missions also increase the military capabilities of the nations they are supporting.

The role of Special Forces in peace, conflict, and war completes chapter one of the manual. Numerous chapters of FM 31-20, while important for Special Forces, are not pertinent to this thesis. Chapters two, four through eight, and thirteen through sixteen, whose titles are:

- Threats to Special Forces Operations.
- Special Forces Organizations and Functions.
- Command and Control of Special Forces Operations.
- Operational Bases.
- Special Forces Mission Planning and Preparation.
- Infiltration and Exfiltration.
- Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
- Combat Service Support of Special Forces Operations.
- Psychological Operations in Support of Special Forces Operations.
- Civil Affairs Support to Special Forces.

fit into this category. Chapter three, "Special Forces Missions" provides a general description of each Special Forces mission. Chapters nine through twelve go into greater detail on each of the four missions appropriate to this thesis. The remainder of the current review will briefly describe each mission as delineated in chapters three and nine through twelve for that specific mission.

Unconventional warfare is the most challenging of the four missions. It is a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source."<sup>85</sup>

Unconventional warfare is the military and paramilitary side of an insurgency or armed resistance movement in a prolonged politico-military activity. Unconventional warfare includes four interrelated

activities: guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage. Guerrilla warfare is "military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominately indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement."<sup>86</sup> Evasion and escape assists military and other selected personnel to move from a sensitive, hostile, or enemy held area to an area that is under friendly control.<sup>87</sup>

Subversion is "an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength of a nation."<sup>88</sup> Every element of the resistance contributes to subversion. However, the underground performs most of the subversive activity because of its clandestine nature.

Sabotage is "an activity designed to injure or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully damaging or destroying any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources."<sup>89</sup> Sabotage uses minimum manpower and materiel resources to selectively neutralize, disrupt, or destroy the enemies capabilities.

Next the discussion turns to foreign internal defense. Special Forces' primary mission in foreign internal defense is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. Foreign internal defense is not exclusively a Special Forces mission. Foreign internal defense involves the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."<sup>90</sup> Special Forces missions in foreign internal defense

are only a portion of the overall mission. Foreign internal defense may be conducted during peace, conflict, or war.

The intent of foreign internal defense missions is to improve the tactical and technical performance of the host nation forces so they can defeat an insurgency without conventional United States military involvement. Many of the capabilities Special Forces use in an unconventional warfare mission are used in a foreign internal defense mission, only the operational environment is different. Special Forces foreign internal defense missions fall into seven categories. These are: training assistance, advisory assistance, intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil-military operations, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

The other two Special Forces missions of direct action and special reconnaissance are different from unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense in that they do not rely on the indirect application of military force through a non-United States power. Direct action and special reconnaissance are normally unilateral (done just by United States forces) and limited in scope and duration. Direct action and special reconnaissance are similar operations except for actions conducted in the target area.

Direct action missions are "combat operations conducted beyond the range of tactical weapons systems or the area of influence of conventional military forces."<sup>91</sup> Special Forces teams can use direct assaults, raids, ambushes, sniping, or subtle forms of attack such as clandestine sabotage in direct action missions. They can also emplace mines or other munitions as well as provide terminal guidance for



precision guided munitions. The purpose of direct action operations is to attack critical targets or target systems, to interdict critical lines of communications, or to capture, rescue or recover designated personnel or materiel.

Special reconnaissance missions include a "broad range of intelligence collection activities, to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition."<sup>92</sup> Special reconnaissance operations are normally conducted beyond the range of tactical collection systems and occur in peace, conflict, or war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

There are two broad categories of special reconnaissance operations: battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, and clandestine collection. Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance "involves the use of standard patrolling tactics and techniques. . . . (They) are often for extended durations beyond or in the absence of conventional fire support or sustainment means."<sup>93</sup> Clandestine collection is sensitive and complex and uses "the signal intelligence and human intelligence techniques normally reserved to the US intelligence community."<sup>94</sup>

FM 31-20 includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post strike reconnaissance as part of the special reconnaissance mission. However, none of these are discussed or listed in a broad category as described in the preceding paragraph.

In conclusion, FM 31-20 is a tremendous improvement over all previous manuals of Special Forces. It clearly lays out the missions of Special Forces, its role in the Army and as a source for the National Command Authority, and how Special Forces support operations across

the operational continuum at all levels of war. For the first time since 1974, FM 31-20 provides all of this information in one unclassified manual. Moreover, FM 31-20 clearly supports the 1986 FM 100-5. Compatibility with the future FM 100-5 will be determined in chapter four.

One last review concludes the survey of Special Forces doctrine. FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, includes Special Forces.

FM 100-25, published in December 1991, is the first of its kind. It draws together the doctrine of all the Army's Special Operations Forces in one manual. Unlike other manuals, it has no predecessors.

FM 100-25 is very similar to FM 31-20. In many cases they are identical. The roles of Special Operations Forces in war, at all the levels of war, in conflict, and peace, here called peacetime competition, are the same in the two manuals. The missions of Special Operations Forces as described in this manual are similar to FM 31-20. In short, the doctrine in the two manuals is the same.

However, there are two features unrelated to doctrine that reveal a step forward. Several changes in the organization of Special Forces occurred after the publication of FM 31-20, and these changes appear in FM 100-25. The other feature is FM 100-25 provides historical examples so the reader can relate the doctrine to past events. This change might seem unimportant but it allows the reader to comprehend the doctrine more easily.

## Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the available literature necessary for an understanding of this thesis. It has included the theory and strategy of Special Forces doctrine, a history of Special Forces, Army doctrine, and Special Forces doctrine. The intention has been to afford the reader a knowledge base appropriate to the substantive portion of the thesis. The stage is now set to develop the methodology upon which the analysis is based.

## CHAPTER I I I

### RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the type of research, the research methodology, the steps in the research, and the criteria for analysis of the evidence relevant to the research question.

#### Type of Research

Tyrus Hillway in Introduction to Research describes three types of research: fact-finding, critical interpretation, and complete research.

Complete research is used in this thesis and

aims at solving problems and stating generalizations after a thorough search for the pertinent facts, an analysis and logical classification of all the evidence found, and the development of a reasonable pattern of support for the conclusion reached.<sup>1</sup>

Complete research consists of five elements. The first element is the consideration that there must be a problem to be solved. For this thesis the problem is the research question. The second element is that there must be evidence. The evidence for this thesis is provided in the books, articles, and manuals reviewed in chapter two. The third element is a careful analysis of the evidence according to which the evidence is arranged in a logical pattern and tested in reference to the problem. The fourth is the arranging of the evidence into arguments leading to a solution to the problem. Chapter four addresses the third and fourth

elements. The fifth and final element, the answer to the research question, appears in the final chapter of the thesis.

### Methodology

Methodology is the systematic approach by which a researcher moves from the initial identification of a question to its final conclusion. The methodology used in this thesis is that of qualitative research with an emphasis on comparison. Qualitative research is appropriate to subjects which do not readily lend themselves to empirical or quantitative analysis. It is a methodology by which the researcher collects, analyzes, and synthesizes evidence to refine the problem, to determine relationships, to establish context, to attain perspective, to exclude extraneous data, and to arrive at conclusions in support of a logical argument. Since this study focuses on the compatibility of doctrine, the stress will fall on comparative analysis.

Analysis to determine the compatibility of Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine as delineated in FM 31-20 and the draft FM 100-5 consists of five steps. The first step is to determine the compatibility of the foundations for each of the doctrines. The foundations of Special Forces doctrine are the principles of war and the Special Operations imperatives. The principles and imperatives are found in chapter one of FM 31-20. This chapter is titled "Overview of Special Forces Operations." The foundations of Army Operations doctrine are the principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, and the tenets. These foundations are detailed in chapters two and eight. These chapters are titled "Fundamentals of Army Operations," and "Operations Other Than War," respectively.

The second, third, fourth, and fifth steps involve a detailed comparison of each of the four primary Special Forces missions with the two primary missions specified in the draft FM 100-5. These two primary missions are offense and defense.

Doctrinal comparisons are based on a textual analysis of the pertinent literature. This textual analysis is literal in the sense that it is based on a close reading of the documents with an eye toward categories of comparison. At the same time, comparison and analysis are informed by reference to a large body of contextual literature reviewed in chapter two.

### Criteria

In order to be compatible with Army Operations, Special Forces doctrine must meet two criteria. These criteria are:

1. It must be consistent with Army Operations doctrine.
2. It must be unified with Army Operations doctrine.

### Consistent

Consistent is considered as "constantly adhering to the same principles, course, form, . . . (and of) holding firmly together."<sup>2</sup> To be consistent Special Forces doctrine must adhere to the same principles as does Army Operations. In other words, the same principles that form the foundations of Army Operations doctrine must be the same principles that form the foundations of Special Forces doctrine.

Special Forces must hold firmly with Army Operation doctrine. All of the Special Forces missions must relate to and contribute to the two missions of Army Operations. This does not mean, of course, that all

four Special Forces missions must relate directly to the two missions of Army Operations. The four Special Forces missions must be able to work in conjunction with Army Operations.

### Unified

Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations must "form into a single unit or a harmonious whole"<sup>3</sup> in order to be unified. The foundations of Special Forces doctrine must not contradict the foundations of Army Operations. Also, the four Special Forces missions should form a whole body of mutually supporting missions with the two Army Operations missions. When combined, Special Forces and Army Operations doctrines should work together.

### Conclusion

This chapter has described the type of research, the research methodology, the specific steps in relation to the methodology, the foundations and the missions used in the analysis, and the criteria necessary for the analysis. In order for Special Forces doctrine to be considered compatible with Army Operations, both criteria must be answered in the affirmative during each step in the research methodology. Anything less than this and the answer to the research question is "no".

In chapter four this thesis applies these steps and criteria to determine the answer to the research question.

## CHAPTER I V

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

In the first chapter this study provided a background for the importance of doctrine and discussed the many changes that have occurred in the Army and in Special Forces since the publication of the 1986 FM 100-5. In addition, chapter one stated the research question and the importance of its answer to the Special Forces community. Chapter two surveyed available literature in four major areas to provide a knowledge base and understanding of the research question in context. Chapter three identified the research methodology, the steps in the analysis, and the criteria to be used in the analysis. This chapter focuses on analysis. This chapter falls into five sections in accordance with the steps of the analysis outlined in chapter three. These five sections are "Foundations," "Unconventional Warfare," "Foreign Internal Defense," "Direct Action," and "Special Reconnaissance."

#### Foundations

##### Army Operations Doctrine

The foundations of Army Operations doctrine are based on three sets of concepts, the principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, and the tenets. Understanding Army Operations demands a



knowledge of these principles and tenets. The principles will be discussed first, then the tenets.

### Principles of War

The nine principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war across the operational continuum and at all levels of war. These nine principles are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.

To observe the principle of the objective is to, "Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."<sup>1</sup> The military objective of war is to destroy the enemy force and his will to fight. In operations other than war the ultimate objective, though possibly harder to define, must also be clear from the beginning. The objectives at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war must be linked and every action must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. Any action that does not contribute to the objective is irrelevant.

The principle of the offensive means to, "Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative."<sup>2</sup> Emphasis on the offensive is the way the Army gains and maintains the initiative to achieve decisive results. It is the most effective way to obtain the established objective of an operation and is the key to victory. The defense is adopted only on a temporary basis. Commanders at all levels are to seek every opportunity to regain the offensive.

Mass is defined as the massing of the "effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time."<sup>3</sup> Mass refers to the massing of effects, not necessarily the concentration of forces, to achieve the desired result. Mass is achieved by synchronizing the elements of combat power against the enemy in a short period of time.

Economy of force, the fourth principle of war, is the allocation of the minimal essential combat power to secondary efforts. The purpose of an economy of force mission is to allow the massing of combat power somewhere else on the battlefield, generally with the main effort. Economy of force missions include limited attacks, defense, delays, and retrogrades.

Maneuver is the placing of the "enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power."<sup>4</sup> Maneuver is the movement of friendly forces in relation to the enemy in order to gain and maintain positional advantage. By maintaining positional advantage a force retains its freedom of action, causes the enemy to continually react to different problems, and reduces friendly vulnerability. Maneuver allows the force to dictate the terms of battle and eventually leads to the enemy's defeat.

Unity of command is the sixth principle of war and is defined as, "For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort."<sup>5</sup> Unity of command requires that all forces operate under one commander. Unity of effort, "requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure."<sup>6</sup> During combined and interagency operations unity of effort is all important because unity of command might not be possible.

Security is defined as, "Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage."<sup>7</sup> A unit takes security measures to protect itself from enemy actions. However, security should not interfere with friendly responsiveness and flexibility. The application of this principle does not

mean unwarranted caution; it means a careful weighing of security and risk.

Surprise means, "Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared."<sup>8</sup> Surprise does not imply that the enemy must be unaware of what is going on, only that he must become aware too late to react effectively. Surprise allows a force to achieve success far out of proportion to what it would achieve without it. Speed, good intelligence, deception, greater combat power, operations security, and changing of tactics and methods of operation all contribute to surprise. Applying these techniques allows the force to achieve surprise in the tempo of battle, timing, and the direction or location of the main effort.<sup>9</sup>

The final principle of war is simplicity. It means the preparation of "clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding."<sup>10</sup> Simplicity facilitates understanding at all levels of command and minimizes confusion. Simple plans and orders are especially important when commanders and soldiers are tired.

#### Principles of Operations Other Than War

The 1993 Draft FM 100-5 introduces for the first time the six principles of operations other than war. These principles are objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. Objective, unity of effort, and security are also principles of war and have already been covered.

Legitimacy is, "Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions."<sup>11</sup> Legitimacy is the perception of the

population that the constituted authority is valid and capable to meet the needs of the populace. If a force answers an immediate need but in accomplishing the mission detracts from the legitimacy of the government, the force is not successful. Legitimacy must always be considered in every mission.

Perseverance means, "Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."<sup>12</sup> Unlike war, operations other than war may be conducted over long periods of time. Peacetime operations and conflicts short of conventional war may require years to attain the desired results, and the beginning and the end of these operations may not be clearly defined. Before conducting contingency operations in these environments the long-term strategic objective must be considered. Commanders must "balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on operations."<sup>13</sup>

Restraint means to, "Apply appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>14</sup> Rules of engagement are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive in operations other than war. These rules may change frequently and there may also be constraints on specific weapons, tactics, and the level of violence. The use of excessive force may also hurt the achievement of the short- and long-term goals of the mission.

### Tenets

The five tenets of Army Operations describe the characteristics of successful operations. Victory depends on the Army's ability to operate

in accordance with them. These five tenets are initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.

In war, application of the tenets allows the Army to throw the enemy off balance and to keep him there by continually making him react to multiple threats from multiple directions. Each threat must be quick, unpredictable, powerful, and disorganizing. In war, observing the tenets allows the quickest possible victory, with the least amount of force, with the fewest casualties.

The application of the five tenets in operations other than war helps establish conditions for victory. Following the tenets allows a friendly force the maximum flexibility for anticipating and mastering the many difficult challenges occurring in operations other than war.

Initiative "sets or changes the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. Applied to the force as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo, while we retain freedom of action."<sup>15</sup> Commanders interpret initiative to mean that they must anticipate events on the battlefield in a manner which allows them and their units to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent.

Initiative in the offense means never allowing the enemy to recover from the jolt of the initial attack. In the offense a commander achieves the initiative by picking the time and place of the attack, as well as the tempo and violence of the attack, in a way that surprises and confuses the enemy. The commander retains the initiative by continually

seeking enemy vulnerabilities and being able to sustain and shift the main effort as necessary.

Initiative in the defense means being able to quickly defeat the enemy attack and going on the offensive as soon as possible. The defender must react quickly to counteract the initial advantages of the enemy and to restrict the enemy's options as much as possible. Once the enemy commits to a particular course of action the defender must thwart this action and forestall any reaction by the attacker. The defender can then assume the initiative.

In operations other than war the initiative "implies controlling the environment rather than letting the environment control events."<sup>16</sup> During peace, when no enemy exists, such as during a disaster relief operation, the commander must direct his forces to the critical facilities where quick action allows the local civilian government to assume control at the earliest possible moment. During conflict, when an enemy exists, the commander uses military power in concert with other elements of national power to restore stability while defeating the enemy's ability to cause instability.<sup>17</sup>

The second tenet is agility. Agility is the "ability of friendly forces to act and react faster than the enemy -- is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. It is as much a mental as a physical quality."<sup>18</sup> The ability to concentrate friendly strength against enemy weaknesses, and once he reacts, to re-concentrate friendly strength against a new weakness will quickly wear the enemy down. This will lead him to slow, disjointed, and haphazard responses, and to his defeat. Agility allows a smaller force to defeat a larger force.

Agility is also a mental ability. Battle always causes confusion, friction, unexpected enemy reactions, and unforeseen problems. Mental agility enables leaders, staffs, and soldiers to overcome these hardships. Mental agility also enables a commander to continue to make quick decisive decisions and actions under extreme hardships.

In operations other than war, agility enables commanders to notice changes to the operational environment and to prepare procedures for applying resources to control change. Agility is an awareness that sees and anticipates changes in the environment. This perceptiveness, combined with the ability to act quickly, leads to agility and successful outcomes in operations other than war.

The third tenet is depth. Depth is the "extension of operations in time, space, and purpose."<sup>19</sup> Thinking in depth allows the commander to foresee, plan, and attack the enemy everywhere on the battlefield. Thinking in depth also allows the commander to maintain the initiative, anticipate enemy reactions, and to synchronize the present and future battles. Attacking the enemy throughout his depth during the offense and defense reduces his freedom of action, agility, and staying power, and disrupts his plans and orders.

In operations other than war, depth is generally more extended in time than in war. Peacetime engagements and conflicts can last for years. Short-term solutions might prolong rather than shorten events. Thinking in depth requires commanders to look for the best solutions for the long run. Anticipating future situations and solving them in depth will help achieve the desired end state.

Synchronization is the "focus of resources and activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. . . . (It) is both a process and a result."<sup>20</sup> Synchronization is successful when activities are arranged correctly in time and space to achieve the desired outcome. All operations do not necessarily have to occur at the same time or place to achieve this. In operations other than war and in war itself, "the product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success."<sup>21</sup>

The last tenet of Army Operations is versatility. It is the "ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements. . . . (It) implies a capacity to be multi-functional, to operate across regions throughout the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."<sup>22</sup> Units must be able to adapt to different missions and tasks in short periods of time. They must be able to conduct successful operations in war and in operations other than war.

### Special Forces Doctrine

Special Forces doctrine is based on two sets of concepts. These concepts are the principles of war and the Special Operations imperatives.

#### Principles of War

The nine principles of war for Special Operations Forces are the same nine principles of war for Army Operations. The nature of Special Operations, however, requires a different application of these same principles.



Objectives for Special Operations Forces are as often political, economic, or psychological as they are military. Special Operations objectives usually focus on the enemy's vulnerabilities. However, Special Operations Forces can be assigned objectives which lead directly to accomplishing national and theater political, economic, or psychological objectives.

The offensive is similar to both conventional and Special Operations Forces. Special Operations are inherently offensive. Even though Special Operations Forces can be employed as part of the strategic defensive, and can assume a defensive position once employed, Special Operations Forces provide the operational level commander an offensive capability.

Special Operations Forces cannot mass, bringing overwhelming combat power against a target - the third principle - except at the lowest tactical level. Special Operations Forces must selectively apply sufficient combat power to accomplish the mission. This minimum force condition entails high risk, but Special Operations Force commanders compensate for lack of overwhelming firepower by using combat multipliers, including surprise, superior training, and unconventional tactics.

The fourth principle is economy of force. Many Special Operations Force missions are designed as an economy of force to allow the concentration of conventional forces in another area. In addition, Special Operations can be designed to divert enemy forces to secondary theaters which prevent them from concentrating their effort against the friendly conventional main effort. When used with indigenous forces

against the enemy, Special Operations Forces are particularly effective in the economy of force mission.<sup>23</sup>

Special Operations Forces do not employ maneuver, the fifth principle, in the same sense as conventional forces. Special Operations Forces almost always lack the tactical mobility and reinforcement capability with respect to the enemy force. Special Operations Forces compensate for lack of maneuver by anticipating enemy reactions and preparing for these reactions. Maneuver, with respect to Special Operations "implies the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas so as to gain a positional advantage from which SOF can attack hostile vulnerabilities."<sup>24</sup>

For conventional forces the sixth principle, unity of command, means having one commander responsible for each objective. While this is also true for Special Operations Forces, the commander is often not military. Many Special Operations are interagency or intergovernmental activities, in which the military has only a supporting role. In these cases the Special Operations Force commander must ensure that his efforts are synchronized with the overall objectives. At the tactical level, where the mission is a unilateral Special Forces mission, unity of command must be maintained.

Security, the seventh principle, is often the dominant factor in Special Operations, as opposed to conventional operations, where it is a supporting concern. Due to the nature of Special Operations, a "breach in security can affect national credibility and legitimacy as well as mission success."<sup>25</sup>

Surprise, the eighth principle, is similar for Special Operations Forces and conventional forces. However, where surprise is desired in conventional operations, it is a necessity in Special Operations. Due to the small size of Special Operations Forces, surprise is an integral part of every operation.

The last principle is simplicity. Simplicity is also an integral part of Special Operations. Although Special Operations Forces will often use high technology equipment and unorthodox methods, Special Operations Force plans and procedures must be simple and direct.<sup>26</sup>

### Special Operations Imperatives

The principles of war characterize and provide guidance to Special Operations Forces. The Special Operations Imperatives prescribe requirements. Special Forces leaders must incorporate the imperatives into their operations in order to use their units efficiently. There are eleven imperatives. The imperatives are: recognize political implications, facilitate interagency activities, engage the threat discriminately, consider long-term effects, ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations, anticipate and control psychological effects, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, ensure long-term sustainment, provide sufficient intelligence, and balance security and synchronization.

Special Forces commanders must recognize the political implications of their mission. Special Forces missions are frequently supporting military missions for attainment of an overall nonmilitary objective. This is especially true during peace and conflict. Even when conducting missions during war, whether independent or in coordination

with conventional forces, Special Forces commanders must consider the political ramifications of their mission.

Special Forces commanders must attempt unity of effort when missions involve interagency or combined operations. Leaders must make use of every opportunity to facilitate the successful synchronization of the often complex mission structure. They must anticipate vague missions, opposing interests and objectives, and a lack of unity of command, and strive to overcome these handicaps.

Special Forces commanders also must engage the threat discriminately. Special Forces missions often have political implications and, therefore, commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ their forces. This is especially important because Special Forces commanders have limited forces that are not easily replaced.

Special Forces units are often involved in long-duration missions. A short-term solution to a long-term problem many times has an adverse effect. Special Forces commanders must put every problem into its wider political, military, and psychological context. Special Forces units must often cope with legal and political constraints not imposed on conventional forces because of the sensitivity of their missions. Special Forces commanders must always consider the long-term effects of their actions.

Special Forces commanders must always ensure the legitimacy and credibility of their mission. Legitimacy is a guiding factor in all operations in which support is provided to a government or resistance organization in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions. Special Forces missions must be credible and legitimate as

viewed by foreign indigenous elements, the United States population, and the international community.

The sixth imperative requires Special Forces commanders to anticipate and control psychological effects. All Special Forces missions have some psychological impact, and some missions are undertaken specifically to produce certain psychological effects. Special Forces commanders must control these effects to achieve the desired result, and they must integrate psychological operations into all of their missions.

Special Forces commanders must apply their capabilities indirectly, especially when conducting unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions. The main role of Special Forces in these missions is to advise, train, and assist the supported forces, not to assume the primary role. The supported resistance organization or government must be the primary players in order to maintain legitimacy and credibility.

Special Forces commanders must develop multiple options for every mission. Commanders must do this so they can maintain their flexibility. They must also have the flexibility to shift from one option to the other during a mission.

Long-term Special Forces missions must be capable of being sustained. Programs developed during long-term missions must be within the capabilities of the host nation in case United States assistance is either curtailed or lost. If the population becomes dependent on programs that are beyond the capability of the host government and the assistance is rolled back, the long-term effect of this program would be detrimental to the overall objective.

Special Forces teams must be provided sufficient intelligence to accomplish their mission. Special Forces intelligence requirements demand much more of the intelligence community than do conventional forces. This is because Special Forces teams lack the combat power, reinforcement capabilities, and sustainment capabilities of general purpose forces. These realities require Special Forces commanders to prioritize their intelligence requirements to insure that what is really needed is provided, that what is nice to have is given second priority, and that the intelligence community is not overwhelmed with providing non-essential requirements.

The final imperative is that Special Forces commanders must balance security and synchronization. Special Forces missions demand security but over compartmentation can leave key assets out of mission planning. Not enough security can compromise a mission but too much can also lead to mission failure because of lack of coordination. Special Forces commanders must balance these conflicting demands.

#### Analysis

The foundations of Army Operations doctrine and Special Forces doctrine must be consistent and unified to be considered compatible. Special Forces doctrine uses as its foundation the principles of war and the Special Operations imperatives. These two sets of concepts were used because FM 31-20 had to be compatible with the 1986 FM 100-5. The '86 FM 100-5 used the principles of war, the four tenets and the AirLand Battle imperatives as its foundation. FM 31-20 did not use the four tenets as part of its foundation.

The principles of war have undergone some minor changes since the '86 version. These are discussed below, but there are more important changes between the '93 and '86 versions of FM 100-5. The most important changes between the versions, for this thesis, are the addition of the principles of operations other than war, the addition of the fifth tenet, versatility, and the deletion of the AirLand Battle imperatives.

The changes in the principles of war will be discussed first. The '86 definition of mass is, "Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time,"<sup>27</sup> while the '93 definition is, "Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time."<sup>28</sup> The difference between these two definitions is a matter of application. The '86 definition stresses applying direct combat power while the '93 version stresses applying the effects of combat power.

The '93 version is in fact more consistent and unified with how Special Forces applies the principle of mass than is the '86 version. Special Forces cannot mass combat power except at the lowest tactical level. Special Forces can, however, mass effects, and is one of the effects to be massed. For example, a Special Forces team on a special reconnaissance mission can provide intelligence on an enemy force to an operational commander. This intelligence allows him to mass his combat power at the correct time and place to accomplish his mission. This Special Forces team does not mass combat power, but is one of the instruments that lead to the correct massing of the effects of combat power. Operations Desert Shield and Storm provided numerous examples of this.

Unity of command has also changed. The '86 definition of unity of command is, "For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander,"<sup>29</sup> while the '93 version states, "For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort."<sup>30</sup> The '86 version is concerned with war, and only war. The '93 version is concerned with war and operations other than war. In war it is easy for unity of effort under one commander to be achieved because the military is the overriding element of national power. In operations other than war one of the other three elements of national power, or a combination thereof, is the dominant factor. The military element is secondary. Under these circumstances, unity of command and unity of effort are desired and sought, but they might not be possible. The '93 version reflects this. Special Forces doctrine also reflects this. It is embodied in the Special Operations imperative, facilitate interagency activity. Again, Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations are more consistent and unified than Special Forces doctrine and AirLand Battle doctrine.

As stated before, Special Forces doctrine and AirLand Battle doctrine are compatible. Army Operations doctrine, though, made two changes to the principles of war. Does this make Special Forces doctrine incompatible with Army Operations doctrine? No. The above analysis has shown that Special Forces doctrine is more fully compatible with the Army Operations definitions of the principles of war than the AirLand Battle definitions.

The next item is the addition of the fifth tenet -- versatility. Versatility is the ability of "units to meet diverse mission requirements. . . a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across regions throughout



the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."<sup>31</sup> Units must be versatile under Army Operations doctrine.

FM 31-20 states that Special Forces "plans, conducts, and supports SO in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. . . . The role of SF varies with the environment and the level of activity."<sup>32</sup> These definitions are almost identical. Army Operations requires versatile units, and Special Forces units are versatile.

Here are several examples. Special Forces units participated in a war during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They participated in operations other than war during Operation Provide Comfort and the continuing support for the professionalization of the El Salvadorian Army. These few examples show that Special Forces can perform missions at any level of war throughout the operational continuum. Special Forces units meet the requirement of the fifth tenet. Special Forces units are then compatible with the Army Operations tenets.

The next step in analysis involves the remaining concerns of the compatibility between the foundations of the two doctrines. The dropping of the imperatives of AirLand Battle doctrine and the addition of the principles of operations other than war are compared to the Special Operations imperatives.

Army Operations doctrine dropped the use of the imperatives because of a different thinking in the purpose of doctrine. AirLand Battle had ten imperatives and Army Operations has none because Army Operations doctrine is intended to be descriptive, not prescriptive. The

Army doctrine writers felt that the '86 version of AirLand Battle had become too prescriptive and wanted to change its focus. Thus the dropping of the imperatives did not change the doctrine, it only changed the focus of the doctrine.<sup>33</sup>

Yet, Special Forces doctrine has imperatives. Does the fact that Special Forces doctrine has imperatives and Army Operations doctrine does not affect the compatibility of the two doctrines? The lower the level of the doctrine, the more prescriptive it usually becomes. Special Forces doctrine is two levels below Army Operations doctrine, and Army Special Operations Force doctrine, FM 100-25, is between the two doctrines. It is not inconsistent for Army Operations doctrine to have no imperatives and Special Forces doctrine to have them.

The most important difference between Army Operations doctrine and AirLand Battle doctrine is the addition of the principles of operations other than war. These principles will be analyzed in relation to the Special Operations imperatives.

There are six principles of operations other than war but only three of them are different from the principles of war. These three principles are legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint. There are eleven Special Operations imperatives. Two of these imperatives, facilitate interagency activities and balance security and synchronization, have a direct correlation to the two principles of unity of command/effort and security, and have already been discussed. They will not be analyzed here again. Seven of the imperatives have some relationship to the principles of operations other than war. Two of the imperatives have no

correlation with the principles. The seven imperatives will be analyzed first.

The principle of legitimacy is, "Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions"<sup>34</sup> Prior to the advent of this principle Special Forces doctrine addressed the same concern with five Special Operations imperatives. One imperative, ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations, addresses this concern directly. This principle and the imperative are certainly consistent and unified because they say the same thing, one for the Army as a whole, one for Special Operations Forces.

The second imperative is to apply capabilities indirectly. In this imperative Special Forces units must let the resistance organization or government be the primary players. Special Forces units advise, train, and assist. If they assume the primary role, the organization or government they are supporting will lose credibility and legitimacy. Again, this imperative is unified and consistent with the principle.

The third imperative is to ensure long-term sustainment. Long-term missions must be sustainable by the host government. If they are not, and a program cannot be sustained without United States support, the government will lose credibility. Loss of legitimacy follows loss of credibility. Therefore, this imperative is also compatible with the principle of legitimacy.

The fourth imperative is to recognize political implications. Special Forces commanders are taught to always consider the political implications of their missions. Commanders must insure that the

mission, and how they conduct it, does not have adverse political implications. If it does, the legitimacy and credibility of the mission, the strategic aim, and the government could be affected. This imperative is therefore consistent with the principle of legitimacy.

The final imperative relating to the principle of legitimacy is to anticipate and control psychological effects. The psychological results of Special Forces missions must uphold the legitimacy and credibility of the government they are supporting. If the tactical side of a mission is a success and the psychological side is a failure, the mission is a failure. All Special Forces missions have some psychological impact, and some are conducted solely for psychological reasons. Special Forces commanders must insure that the psychological impact supports the legitimacy of United States and the supported government. This imperative, then, is consistent with the principle of legitimacy.

The second principle of operations other than war is perseverance. It is, "Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."<sup>35</sup> Perseverance requires a long-term perspective on operations other than war. Short-term solutions must be cautiously weighed against long-term strategic aims. Perseverance also supports the view that while some operations may be of short duration, many will be of long duration and may have no clear beginning and end.

Two Special Operations imperatives pertain to this principle. The first is to consider long-term effects. This imperative correlates directly with the principle of perseverance. Special Forces commanders must always consider the long-term effects of their mission, even if it is

itself a short duration mission. This imperative is consistent and unified with the principle.

The second imperative is to ensure long-term sustainment. This imperative has been mentioned already under the legitimacy principle but it is also pertinent here. Attainment of long-term strategic aims cannot be achieved if the aim cannot be sustained. Perseverance cannot be accomplished without the will and the logistics to maintain the operation. Therefore, this imperative is also compatible with the principle of perseverance.

The last principle of operations other than war is restraint. Restraint is, "Apply appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>36</sup> Rules of engagement and restraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence are generally more restrictive in operations other than war than they are in war. Not observing these restraints could hinder the attainment of the goals of the mission.

One Special Operations imperative pertains to this principle. It is to engage the threat discriminately. Special Forces commanders must carefully select where, when, and how they use their forces for two reasons. One is because commanders have limited resources that are hard to replace and the second is because Special Forces missions usually have political consequences. This meaning, while different on the political side of the imperative from the principle, retains the same meaning in deciding when, where, and how to employ forces. This imperative relates directly to the principle of restraint.

There are two imperatives that do not relate to the principles of operations other than war. These imperatives are to develop multiple

options and to provide sufficient intelligence. These imperatives are different from the other imperatives in that they relate to just the Special Forces unit conducting the mission. For example, if a commander does not develop multiple options, his mission might fail, but a failure that does not consider multiple options will not harm the overall strategic aim. If a mission fails because a commander does not consider the long-term effects, the ultimate effect would be much greater. Thus, these two imperatives are not significant to the compatibility of the two doctrines.

### Conclusion

This analysis has shown that the foundations of Army Operations doctrine and Special Forces doctrine are compatible. The principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, the tenets, the Special Operations Forces application of the principles of war, and the Special Operations imperatives are all consistent and unified. Next, an analysis of the two missions of offense and defense will be conducted with reference to the four Special Forces missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance.

### Unconventional Warfare

The analysis of the compatibility of unconventional warfare and the missions of offense and defense requires a description of these three missions. Descriptions of the offense and defense are covered first, followed by unconventional warfare. Additionally, since the offense and defense are used in the analysis of the other three Special Forces

missions, their description below will hold for the remainder of the thesis.

## Offense

The main purpose of the offense is to

defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, offensive operations are undertaken to secure decisive terrain, deprive the enemy of resources, gain information, deceive and divert the enemy, hold him in position, disrupt his attack, and set up the conditions for future successful operations.<sup>37</sup>

At the operational level, "Offensive campaigns and major operations can take different shapes. It is usually best to design them to quickly and decisively achieve operational and strategic objectives at least cost."<sup>38</sup> To accomplish these aims operational and tactical commanders arrange the battlefield into deep, close, and rear operations. These operations do not take place in any clearly defined area and many times operations will overlap. However, arranging the battlefield this way allows the commander to better synchronize everything that is happening on the battlefield.

Deep operations are those actions "directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle. These are executed at both the operational and tactical levels with fires, maneuver, and protection."<sup>39</sup> Deep operations are used to shape the battlefield for future close operations. Attack into the enemy's depth retards, disturbs and reduces the capabilities of his force and facilitates his rapid defeat. Deep operations allow the friendly commander to choose the time, place, and mode of the offense.

Joint and Army forces can be used to conduct deep operations. Joint forces include naval gunfire, aviation assets of all services, Marines,

and Special Operations Forces. Army forces include, but are not limited to, airborne and air assault assets, armored forces, target acquisition assets, and field artillery assets.

Close operations are those conducted by forces that are in immediate contact with the enemy. Close operations are the current battles of the forces engaged. They are the "activities of the main and supporting efforts around or through enemy defenses to occupy objectives that permit the defeat of defending forces."<sup>40</sup> Commanders mass the effects of combat to destroy the enemy.

Close operations in the offense also include reconnaissance and security forces and reserve forces. Reconnaissance and security forces protect friendly flanks, find the enemy, locate gaps in the enemy defense, and allow the commander time and space to develop the battlefield. Reserves provide the commander additional forces when he needs them either at the decisive point or when something unforeseen occurs.

Rear operations assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and battle command. Their primary purposes are to sustain the current close and deep fights and to posture the force for future operations. At the operational level, rear operations support current operations and posture the force for the next phase of the major operation or campaign. At the tactical level, they increase depth and enhance the commander's ability to influence the tempo of combat, helping him take advantage of any opportunity without delay.<sup>41</sup>

In the offense rear areas can be quite large, especially when the attack is successful and the maneuver forces are conducting an exploitation or pursuit. This increase in scale makes rear areas more vulnerable to enemy deep attacks and may require the commander to allocate maneuver forces to protect his rear area. A battlefield where the



rear area is not contiguous with the main forces also makes the protection of the rear area more difficult.

A successful enemy deep attack, similar to friendly deep operations into his rear, can disrupt and delay the friendly attack so as to cause its failure. Rear operations includes not only the logistics functions to sustain friendly close and deep operations but the protection of the force in the rear.

As shown in the review of the '93 FM 100-5 in chapter two, the forms of the offense and the forms of maneuver have not changed from AirLand Battle to Army Operations. As also shown in chapter two, while the words that the Army uses to characterize the offense have changed, the characteristics of the offense have not. Therefore, this discussion of the offense and the corresponding analysis concerns itself with only the elements outlined above. This is also true for the defense. The characteristics of defensive operations and the types of defensive patterns either have not changed or are covered in chapter two. The defense is treated in the same manner as the offense.

#### Defense

The defense is conducted "to defeat a large, attacking force, retain territory, build strength, or gain time."<sup>42</sup> At the operational level commanders ensure that their ground operations are coordinated with other assets. These assets include air, sea, space, and Special Operations Forces. The five operations must be synchronized so the commander can use these assets to their fullest extent. At the tactical level the commander must also synchronize all of his assets.

In the defense, units use prepared positions, knowledge of the ground, fires, and counterattacks to defeat the enemy once he commits his forces in close operations. The defender anticipates and acquires intelligence so he can weight the main defensive effort; he seeks every opportunity to first slow, then stop the enemy attack, and then to assume the offensive himself.

The defense is also conducted throughout the depth of the battlefield. The defense is similarly divided into deep, close, and rear operations. To avoid repetition, this discussion will focus only on the differences between these operations for the defense.

Deep operations in the defense are conducted to "disrupt the enemy's movement in depth, destroy high payoff targets vital to the attacker, and interrupt or deny vital enemy operating systems such as command, logistics, or air defense at critical times."<sup>43</sup> Deep operations disrupt the tempo of the attack and desynchronize the attacker's combat power so that the defender does not have to fight the attacker at his maximum strength. Ideally, deep operations will so disrupt the enemy attack that the defender can defeat his forces in detail as they reach the close operations area.

Close operations are the "activities of the main and supporting efforts in the defensive area to slow, canalize, and defeat the enemy's major units."<sup>44</sup> Maneuver forces can defend, delay, attack, and screen in close operations. In the defense security forces give the commander time and space to react to the attacking force by slowing the attacker, providing intelligence to the commander, and destroying the attacker's own reconnaissance and security elements. Reserves in the defense

provide the defender the ability to stop an unexpected enemy penetration, and more importantly, provide the defender a force with which to assume the offensive.

Rear operations are performed in the defense for the same purpose as in the offense. However, because the attacker has the initiative, rear operations units can expect some form of enemy deep battle. Rear operations commanders must think ahead and take effective measures to protect the force.

### Unconventional Warfare

Understanding unconventional warfare requires an understanding of resistance movements and insurgencies and the reasons for their existence. A government's inability or unwillingness to meet the required needs of its people can lead to the frustration and dissatisfaction of the populace. The populace may also feel that the established government is incapable of providing for their internal security or future development. In addition, people could distrust the government because they feel that it is not legitimate. Any or all of these factors, plus others, real or perceived, can cause a population to resist the established government.<sup>45</sup>

Resistance can either be nonviolent or violent, but if the conditions leading to the resistance are oppressive enough, an organized resistance movement may develop. A resistance movement is "an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to oppose or overthrow the established government or cause the withdrawal of an occupying power."<sup>46</sup>

An insurgency is an "organized resistance movement that uses subversion and armed conflict to achieve its aims."<sup>47</sup> Insurgency is a prolonged political-military fight designed to steadily increase insurgent legitimacy and control while decreasing the government's legitimacy and control. Each insurgency has its own characteristics and goals. Revolutionary insurgencies want to destroy the existing government and establish their own. Other insurgencies want to

- Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.
- Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.
- Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.
- Extract political concessions that are unobtainable through less violent means.<sup>48</sup>

Even though each insurgency is unique, successful insurgencies usually pass through three phases. These phases are not separate. They will overlap and an insurgency may move back and forth between the phases, depending upon their successes and the successes of the counterinsurgency.

Phase I is the latent or incipient phase. Resistance leaders try to accomplish several important functions in this phase. They recruit, organize, and train insurgent cadres, establish intelligence, operational, and internal support networks, and develop external support. They also obtain funds, infiltrate civil and governmental agencies, and establish cooperative relationships with legitimate civilian groups, unions, and other front organizations to develop popular support for future political and military actions.<sup>49</sup>

Phase II, the guerrilla warfare phase, begins with overt guerrilla warfare. In an urban based insurgency the guerrillas use cellular

organizations so they can operate clandestinely and maintain security. In a rural based insurgency the guerrillas operate from secure base areas in guerrilla controlled territory of the countryside. All Phase I activities continue. In addition, insurgents establish clandestine radio networks and newspapers to openly challenge the government or occupying power.<sup>50</sup>

Phase III, mobile warfare begins with the transition from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. If successful, this causes the collapse of the government or occupying power and the establishment of the resistance organization as the government. Phase III appears as a civil war if there is no external support to the insurgency. If conducted in concert with a limited or general war, conventional military forces may link-up with the insurgency for Phase III. All of the activities of Phases I and II continue during Phase III. If Phase III fails the insurgency reverts to either Phase I or II and rebuilds its strength.

There are three elements of a resistance organization: the guerrilla force, the underground, and the auxiliary. The guerrilla force is the "overt military or para-military arm of the resistance organization. The guerrilla force conducts low-visibility combat operations. It is normally rural-based. Its members may be full-time or part-time."<sup>51</sup>

The underground is a "cellular organization that conducts clandestine subversion, sabotage, E&E (escape and evasion), and intelligence collection activities. It may be rural- or urban-based and has its own clandestine support organization."<sup>52</sup>

The auxiliary is the clandestine support element for the guerrilla force and can be either rural or urban based. Historically there has been

a clear distinction in unconventional warfare doctrine between the guerrilla force and the underground. However, this distinction is no longer so clear cut. In contemporary unconventional warfare, there may be no clear distinction between the two.

From the United States perspective the

strategic politico-military objective of wartime UW 's normally to influence conventional military operations. In conflict, however, the objectives may range from interdicting foreign intervention in another country, to opposing the consolidation of a new hostile regime, to actually overthrowing such a regime.<sup>53</sup>

Special Forces supports resistance organizations that enhance United States national interests when directed to do so. In war, Special Forces teams infiltrate into enemy controlled areas to conduct unconventional warfare. During conflicts, Special Forces teams may be directed to provide indirect support to a resistance from an external area when direct United States military involvement is inappropriate.

Special Forces support to a resistance organization is divided into seven phases. Each resistance movement is different; therefore, some phases may occur simultaneously and some might not occur at all. Unconventional warfare is, however, easier to comprehend in terms of the seven phases. The seven phases are psychological preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat employment, and demobilization.

During phase one the resistance and external sponsors conduct psychological operations to unify the population against the established government or occupying power and to prepare the population to accept United States support. During phase two US government agencies coordinate with the allied government-in-exile or the resistance

leadership for the desired US support. During phase three Special Forces teams infiltrate the operational area, establish communications with their base, and contact the resistance. In phase four Special Forces teams organize, train, and equip the resistance cadre while emphasizing development of an infrastructure. During phase five Special Forces teams assist the cadre with expansion into an effective resistance organization. Limited combat operations can be conducted but emphasis is on development. Phase six is the combat phase. Unconventional warfare forces conduct combat operations until the end of the conflict or link-up with conventional forces. In phase seven, the final phase, the unconventional warfare forces either demobilize, shift to regular forces, or come under national control.<sup>54</sup>

#### Analysis

The purpose of unconventional warfare in wartime is to influence conventional force operations. As shown by the discussion of unconventional warfare, it is not a short duration mission. Therefore unconventional warfare cannot affect the outcome of a war unless it is a protracted war or unless unconventional warfare has been underway for sometime prior to the advent of the war itself.

Unconventional warfare does not take place in a country that is friendly to United States interests, so it is unlikely that unconventional warfare will take place in friendly rear operations areas. Additionally, unconventional warfare forces will not participate in close operations until phase six, and then only after the link-up with conventional forces. Therefore, unconventional warfare will likely take place in the deep operations area in relation to conventional forces.

Does unconventional warfare support the goals of deep operations? The answer will determine the compatibility of unconventional warfare with Army Operations.

To be consistent and unified with Army Operations unconventional warfare must relate to, contribute to, and support the offensive and defensive missions, and as shown, unconventional warfare must take place in conjunction with deep operations.

Deep operations should destroy, delay, disrupt, and divert enemy forces from the conduct of close battle. Special Forces teams conducting unconventional warfare missions use their forces to conduct combat operations. These combat operations, properly synchronized with the operational and tactical level commander's offensive and defensive plans, delay and divert enemy forces from the close battle to fight the unconventional war in their rear.

Unconventional warfare forces can do many things in the enemy's rear. These forces can destroy railroads and trains which would delay and disrupt the movement of enemy forces to the front. They can destroy fuel and ammunition supplies and factories which would have short- and long- term effects on the enemy's capabilities. There are many other examples of these activities.

Enemy commanders will have to divert close battle forces to counteract such attacks. Diversion of resources will further reduce enemy capabilities in the close operations area. Finally, if unconventional warfare forces can attain the size of conventional forces, they might well defeat the close operations forces directly.



This analysis has shown that unconventional warfare supports and contributes to the winning of offensive and defensive operations. Such contributions will almost always take place in the deep operations area. Unconventional warfare forces may also contribute to close operations in both the offense and defense but only after the unconventional warfare forces and conventional forces have linked-up. The Special Forces mission of unconventional warfare is compatible with the Army Operations missions of offense and defense.

#### Foreign Internal Defense

As stated previously, there is no need to repeat the fundamentals of offensive and defensive operations. This section includes a discussion and analysis of foreign internal defense.

#### Foreign Internal Defense

The primary mission of Special Forces in foreign internal defense is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. The intent of foreign internal defense missions is to improve the tactical and technical performance of the host nation forces. Special Forces foreign internal defense missions fall into seven categories. These categories are: training assistance, advisory assistance, intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil-military operations, populace and resource control, and tactical operations.

In a training assistance role Special Forces can develop and manage training programs that support the host nation forces. These programs range from the most basic combat training to the most

specialized. Many times Special Forces training assistance missions develop a cadre of specialists from trained host nation forces so they can train the rest of their forces.

Special Forces can provide advisory assistance in two ways. One is that Special Forces teams provide advice and assistance to certain host nation forces. The second is that individual soldiers can be assigned or attached to the embassy security assistance office to perform advisory assistance duties.<sup>55</sup>

Special Forces teams may support host nation and United States intelligence operations in a counterinsurgency. This support can assume the form of providing information on the operational area and the insurgent organization. Special Forces concentrates on intelligence operations that "seek to neutralize or destroy the insurgents' political and intelligence infrastructure."<sup>56</sup>

In psychological operations Special Forces teams educate the host nation forces on the value and role of psychological operations. Special Forces teams also help host nation forces develop and implement an effective psychological operations program.

Special Forces teams perform civil-military operations to assist host nation forces in developing effective civil affairs programs that cause the population to support the established government. Civil assistance to the host nation and military civic action are included in Special Forces civil-military operations.

Special Forces teams perform population and resource control missions in an indirect manner. Special Forces teams provide advice and assistance but should not directly participate in the control measures.

In tactical operations missions Special Forces teams advise and assist host nation forces in performing tactical operations. Special Forces teams are particularly qualified to perform these missions because of their extensive unconventional warfare training. There are five types of tactical operations. They are: consolidation, strike, remote area, border, and urban area. These operations are not described but the important factor is that their purpose is to provide a secure environment so the host nation can continue internal development. These tactical operations are not independent military operations solely aimed at destroying the combat forces of the insurgency and their base areas. They must be an integrated portion of a fully synchronized internal defense and development effort.

One other possible foreign internal defense mission for Special Forces is the use of Special Forces in rear area operations during war. Special Forces teams can "organize, train, equip, and direct foreign combat forces to conduct offensive rear operations against a hostile insurgent or SOF threat."<sup>57</sup>

### Analysis

Special Forces units conduct foreign internal defense missions to support friendly governments. Conventional forces can be located within the friendly country where the foreign internal defense mission is taking place. Or, the friendly country may border the hostile country but contain no United States conventional forces. In other words, the foreign internal defense mission may take place in the rear operations or in the deep operations areas, but not in the deep operations area where the

enemy is located (if it was it would be an unconventional warfare mission).

Not all of the foreign internal defense missions discussed above are pertinent for this analysis. There are two foreign internal defense missions that are important. They are training assistance and rear operations. To be compatible these two foreign internal defense missions must contribute and support offensive and defensive operations. They must do this in the deep and rear operations areas. Deep operations form the initial point of analytical departure.

A country that is hostile to the United States will rarely be surrounded by countries friendly to its cause. The operational commander can exploit a situation if the enemy commander can be forced to orient his forces in more than one direction. Here, the Special Forces training assistance mission can help the operational commander. This training assistance mission, with the support of the host nation government, can exert pressure, or the threat of pressure, on the enemy commander. This pressure will force him to commit forces not only against the conventional United States forces but also against the forces of the host nation that Special Forces is supporting.

As stated above, one of the purposes of deep operations is to divert enemy forces from the friendly main effort. The host nation forces, with Special Forces support, can certainly accomplish this. If the host nation decides to attack the hostile country, such action could also destroy, interrupt, and divert even more of the enemy forces.

The rear operations mission has a more direct correlation with offensive and defensive missions. The Special Forces rear operations

mission assists foreign combat forces in conducting offensive rear operations. These operations can be conducted whether the conventional forces are performing offensive or defensive operations. The purpose of rear operations is to destroy enemy insurgent and special operations forces in the friendly rear. Successful rear operations facilitate the flow of logistics to conventional forces and preclude the friendly need to divert conventional forces to rear operations protection. This mission, then, supports and contributes to rear operations in the offense and defense.

This analysis has shown that the Special Forces foreign internal defense mission is compatible with Army Operations doctrine. This mission specifically supports and contributes to deep and rear operations during the offense and defense.

#### Direct Action

Direct action missions are "combat operations conducted beyond the range of tactical weapons systems or the area of influence of conventional military forces."<sup>58</sup> Special Forces teams in direct action missions can use direct assaults, raids, ambushes, sniping, or subtle forms of attack such as clandestine sabotage. These teams can also emplace mines or other munitions, as well as provide terminal guidance for precision guided munitions. The aims of direct action operations are to attack critical targets or target systems, to interdict critical lines of communications, or to capture, rescue or recover designated personnel or materiel.

Special Forces conducts direct action missions in four modes. The first mode is with pure Special Forces teams. The second is with a mix of Special Forces, other Special Operations Forces, and/or

conventional forces. The third mode is with Special Forces led foreign teams, and the fourth is with Special Forces trained and directed foreign teams. The mission determines the size of the team, the mode, and the type of action performed.<sup>59</sup>

Unconventional warfare and direct action are interrelated, especially when the third or fourth modes are employed. Unconventional warfare and direct action are differentiated by three criteria. These are

- DA operations are controlled and directed by a SOF chain of command, not by an indigenous resistance organization with SOF advice and assistance.
- DA operations do not depend on the popular support of the indigenous population.
- DA operations are short-term, with specific and well-defined objectives.<sup>60</sup>

#### Analysis

Direct action missions, by being conducted beyond the range of tactical weapons systems, take place in the deep operations area. Their purposes are to attack critical targets, to interdict critical lines of communication, to capture designated personnel, and to rescue friendly personnel, among others. These missions are conducted irrespective of whether conventional forces are engaged in offensive or defensive operations.

A direct action mission can be conducted in the close operations area, but the fluidity of close operations and the detailed planning requirements of a direct action mission make Special Forces units unsuitable for close operations. The employment of Special Forces teams in close operations must be weighed very carefully against the need to attack the target and the ability of conventional forces to accomplish the mission.

Deep operations are conducted to destroy, delay, disrupt, and divert the enemy's combat power. Deep attacks are also aimed at his command and control and logistics capabilities.

The missions conducted in direct action operations directly support the purposes of deep operations. Direct action missions are designed to destroy, delay, and disrupt the ability of the enemy force to influence close operations. Direct action missions also divert enemy forces from close operations by making the enemy commander use these forces to protect his rear operations area and to counteract the direct action missions.

Therefore, direct action can support and contribute to both offensive and defensive operations. This support and contribution is almost always conducted in the deep operations area but may, after very careful consideration, be conducted in the close operations area.

### Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance missions include a "broad range of intelligence collection activities, to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition."<sup>61</sup> Special reconnaissance operations are normally conducted beyond the range of tactical collection systems and can be conducted in peace, conflict, or war at all levels of war.

There are two special reconnaissance missions that are important here. They are battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance and target acquisition. These missions are normally conducted beyond the range of conventional fire support and sustainment capabilities. There are other special reconnaissance missions, but they are extraneous to this discussion.

Like direct action, special reconnaissance intelligence collection can appear similar to the intelligence collection in unconventional warfare, especially if the mission is of long duration. Special reconnaissance, like direct action, and unlike unconventional warfare, is controlled and directed by a Special Operations Force chain of command and is generally unilateral in nature. A special reconnaissance mission will emphasize United States, or alliance, intelligence requirements, not the intelligence requirements of an indigenous resistance organization.

### Analysis

Special reconnaissance missions are similar to direct action missions except that during special reconnaissance the target is not directly attacked. Special reconnaissance missions support the intelligence function in the synchronization of combat power. Special reconnaissance missions support the operational commander by providing intelligence to facilitate coordination of deep and close operations.

Special reconnaissance missions may include a target attack phase, but the Special Forces teams do not themselves attack the target. The teams conduct target acquisition and identification for precision guided munitions in these operations. Additionally, special reconnaissance missions can be performed in the close operations area, but, like direct action missions, the decision must be carefully thought out.

Special reconnaissance missions are conducted irrespective of whether the conventional forces are on the offense or defense. Special



reconnaissance missions contribute to the offense and defense in the deep operations area.

Unlike direct action missions the special reconnaissance mission does not directly support the purposes of deep operations. Special reconnaissance missions do however, provide the commander the intelligence so he can destroy, disrupt, and delay the enemy.

Special reconnaissance and direct action missions are generally conducted to support operational and strategic level objectives. Thus, such missions support the tactical commander only indirectly. They can directly support the tactical commander's plan if the target is in the tactical commander's deep operations area or if, during the offense, the conventional forces attack successfully and approach the special reconnaissance target area.

This analysis has shown that special reconnaissance missions support and contribute to the success of both offensive and defensive operations. They contribute to these missions primarily in the deep operations area and generally at the operational and strategic level.

### Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the foundations of Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine are consistent and unified, and thus compatible. This chapter has also shown that the four Special Forces missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance are compatible with the offense

and defense as described in Army Operations. Analysis has further shown that Special Forces missions support operational and tactical commanders in deep operations mainly, while Special Forces can also contribute in close and rear operations.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The foregoing chapters of this thesis have addressed the research question, the research rational, pertinent literature, and analysis of appropriate aspects of Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine. This chapter answers the research question. This chapter also answers the secondary questions associated with the thesis topic mentioned in chapter one and finally, offers recommendations for FM 31-20 and for further study.

#### Research Question

Is current Special Forces doctrine compatible with the future doctrine of Army Operations? Yes. Chapter four showed that the foundations of Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine are compatible, as well as the four Special Forces missions and the offensive and defensive missions described in Army Operations.

The foundations of Special Forces doctrine are based on the principles of war and the Special Operations imperatives, while the foundations of Army Operations doctrine are based on the principles of war, the principles of operations other than war, and the tenets. Although the two foundations appear different, chapter four showed that

the Special Operations imperatives are almost identical to the principles of operations other than war.

The tenets of Army Operations doctrine are identical to the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, except that Army Operations added the fifth tenet of versatility. Chapter four showed that Special Forces units meet the tenet of versatility. However, FM 31-20 does not discuss the tenets. Published after the '86 FM 100-5, FM 31-20 should have addressed these tenets in chapter one, when it reviewed AirLand Battle doctrine. This chapter later makes recommendations to correct this.

The four missions of Special Forces support and contribute to the offense and defense. The Special Forces missions support them equally, irrespective of whether the conventional forces are on the offense or defense. This support is accomplished mainly in the deep operations area.

Unconventional warfare supports the conventional forces in deep operations by destroying, disrupting, and delaying the opposing forces in their own rear areas. This is accomplished by attacking enemy lines of communication, industrial bases, logistics areas, and enemy forces directly, among others. Unconventional warfare can support close operations but generally only after link-up with conventional forces.

Foreign internal defense missions also support conventional forces in the deep operations area but can support conventional forces in rear operations. Foreign internal defense missions in deep operations will take place in a friendly country that supports the United States and opposes the hostile force. These missions contribute to deep operations by causing the enemy to divert forces toward the friendly country and

away from conventional United States forces. The friendly country's forces that the foreign internal defense mission supports could also destroy, disrupt, and delay enemy forces, as well as diverting them, if the friendly country actually attacks the hostile country. Foreign internal defense missions can also support rear operations by supporting host nation forces that are protecting the rear operations area.

Direct actions and special reconnaissance missions support conventional forces by targeting strategic and operational targets in the deep operations area. Direct action missions actually attack the target, while special reconnaissance missions provide intelligence on the target. Special reconnaissance missions can also receive target acquisition equipment to designate targets for precision guided munitions, but the teams do not attack the target.

### Secondary Questions

Chapter one introduced several secondary questions as supplements to the primary research question. These secondary questions can now be answered or have already been answered in the process of answering the research question.

Has the Army's keystone doctrine changed significantly from AirLand Battle doctrine to Army Operations doctrine? The literature review provided this answer: No.

The '86 FM 100-5 was based on a European forward deployed Army that was designed to fight in Europe. The final draft FM 100-5 reflects the changes that have taken place in the world and in the Army. The final draft acknowledges the reduction of this threat, the reduction of the Army, and the positioning of the majority of the Army in the United

States. These realities are reflected in the force projection and operations other than war chapters, as well as in the emphasis on joint and combined operations. Chapter four has also shown that the foundations of Special Forces doctrine are even "more" in line with the foundations of Army Operations than they are with the foundations of AirLand Battle.

Are all of the missions of Special Forces compatible with Army Operations? Chapter four clearly showed that the answer is yes.

If all of the missions of Special Forces are not compatible, what must be done to correct the problem? The answer to this question would have been very important if one or all of the missions were not compatible. All of the missions are compatible so the question does not need to be answered.

Does anything need to be done if Special Forces doctrine is compatible with Army Operations? The answer is yes. Pertinent recommendations are covered next.

### Recommendations

Several changes have occurred since the publication of FM 31-20. It is not the intent of this thesis to list all of the changes necessary in a review of FM 31-20. Below is a partial list of recommendations, with the understanding that this thesis focuses on doctrine, not on the organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures of Special Forces.

1. Special Forces doctrine, and thus FM 31-20, needs to include the tenets of Army Operations. The tenets, like the principles of war, should be discussed as they relate to Special Forces doctrine. The current FM 31-20 did a very good job of relating the principles of war to Special Forces operations. The same should be done for the tenets.

2. The next FM 31-20 and the next FM 100-25 need to contain the principles of operations other than war. As shown in chapter four, the Special Operations imperatives are similar to these principles. Writers of the next FM 31-20 have several options regarding the principles and imperatives. The first option is to keep the imperatives and show how they relate to the principles. The second option is to delete the imperatives that relate to the principles, use the principles as a foundation for Special Forces doctrine, and keep the imperatives that are not related to the principles. The third option is to delete the imperatives altogether and adopt the principles as a foundation for Special Forces doctrine. If the principles of operations other than war are adopted as a foundation, how they relate to Special Forces doctrine should be included, in a manner similar to the discussion of the principles of war.

3. An updated and expanded chapter two, "Threats to Special Forces Operations," should be written into the next FM 31-20.

#### Relationship to Previous Studies

This study is the first to highlight the issue of compatibility between Special Forces doctrine and Army Operations doctrine. Major Glenn Harned's 1985 MMAS thesis, Army Special Operations Forces and AirLand Battle, fulfilled a similar purpose with regard to AirLand Battle and Special Operations Forces. Many studies have followed Major Harned's, including this one, in relating Special Forces and Special Operations Forces as a whole to the Army's doctrine. It is hoped that this thesis can form a similar point of departure for further study regarding Special Operations Forces and Army Operations.

### Suggestions for Further Research

Several related topics of concern surfaced during the course of this study. They are beyond the scope of this study but merit further attention. The related questions and concerns are:

1. A study should be conducted to determine the compatibility between Army Operations and Joint Special Operations Force doctrines.
2. Is combat search and rescue an appropriate mission for Special Forces? If it is, what training, equipment, manpower, and other resources does Special Forces need to accomplish this, while still conducting any or all of the other missions.
3. Is counterterrorism an appropriate mission for Special Forces or should it be dropped as a mission?
4. Does FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, still have a purpose? Should it be changed to read, Military Operations in Operations Other Than War, or something similar to reflect new terminology?

### Conclusion

The United States Army must maintain a credible military force to provide a deterrence, and if that fails, to win the land war in support of a unified or specified commander's campaign plan. To be credible the Army must have a mix of heavy, light, and Special Operations Forces.

These forces must also be capable of working together. How they work together is determined by doctrine. Doctrines must be mutually supporting and compatible. This study has shown that Special Forces and Army Operations doctrines are mutually supporting and compatible.



## ENDNOTES

### Chapter I

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<sup>3</sup>The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, (New York: Random House, 1980), p.274.

<sup>4</sup>United States Army Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1990), p. 3-3.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3-2.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3-1.

### Chapter II

<sup>1</sup>Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. xvii.

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<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. xviii.

<sup>4</sup>Roger Beaumont, Special Operations and Elite Units, 1939-1988, (New York: Greenwood, 1988), p. 42.

<sup>5</sup>Lieutenant Colonel John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), p. 79.

- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 79.
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- <sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 80.
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- <sup>10</sup>Otto Hellbrunn, Partisan Warfare, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 161.
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